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Abstract
As a conceptual replication of Tincher, Lebois, and Barsalou (2016), I investigated the
effects of a brief mindfulness intervention on two measures related to intergroup bias: language
abstraction and the differential attribution of uniquely-human emotions to different groups. In
Experiment 1, 207 politically liberal or conservative participants were randomly assigned to a
mindful attention, immersed attention, or no instruction condition. Participants were exposed to a
series of visual and auditory stimuli, including several pictures of valenced behavior performed
by an ingroup or an outgroup member. They were also asked to indicate which emotions are
characteristic of typical ingroup and outgroup members. Experiment 2 had more participants (N
= 265) and introduced several design improvements but was otherwise identical in method. In
neither study was the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB) effect elicited, even within control
conditions (i.e., there was no LIB effect for mindful attention to attenuate). Mindful attention
also did not affect the emotion-attribution measure of infrahumanization, which occurred across
all conditions in both experiments. However, an unanticipated effect was replicated in both
experiments: liberals infrahumanized conservatives, but conservatives’ infrahumanization of
liberals was much weaker and not statistically significant. Discussion focuses on the challenges
and importance of replication in social psychology, the nature and challenge of brief mindfulness
manipulations, and the implications of infrahumanizing political rivals, particularly among
liberals in today’s combative political climate.
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Mindfulness and Implicit Political Intergroup Bias
The ability to observe without evaluating is the highest form of intelligence. This
assertion, expressed in various ways by the philosopher and spiritual teacher Jiddu Krishnamurti
(e.g., Krishnamurti, 1991, p. 152,158, 264-265), captures the distinctive character of
mindfulness, a term that has become increasingly familiar in western culture and academic
scholarship. Krishamurti’s description implies a model of intelligence that is noteworthy because
of what it omits—e.g., judgment, knowledge-acquisition, reasoning, goal-directed behavior, and
social interaction—features historically emphasized in many Western lay and academic
conceptions of intelligence (Cianciolo & Sternberg, 2008; Sternberg, 2000a). In placing primacy
on the act of dispassionate observation, teachers such as Krishnamurti suggest a kind of metaknowledge, derived from direct experience and spontaneous insight, and in which the contents of
the mind—thoughts, emotions, beliefs, goals, memories—are mere objects of present-moment
attention. From this perspective, the mind, and even the self, is essentially no different from, say,
the color of the sunset or the sound of rain; they are all arising and passing phenomena, devoid of
essential or permanent ontological status. Practitioners of meditation often describe the practice
as leading to a state of “awakening,” compared to the relative “delusion” of habitual concepts
and categorization. The key observational technique from meditative practice, mindfulness, has
consequently been a subject of considerable interest among philosophers and social scientists.
While the study of mindfulness has been a common feature of the clinical psychology
and medical literature for the past three decades, it has received comparatively less attention
among sociologists and social psychologists (Karremans & Papies, 2017; Lee, 2015). For
example, as of this writing, a search for the term “mindfulness” in article titles and abstracts in
the sociology database SocINDEX results in 840 entries, compared to 9,632 entries in the
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PsychINFO psychology database. Additionally, searches conducted via the publishers’ websites
for the term “mindfulness” in the title or abstracts of articles within Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, The Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, and Personality and Social Psychology Review—some of
social psychology’s premiere research journals—results in only 51 articles. One consequence of
the lack of social-psychological attention to mindfulness is that the bulk of empirical work has
focused on either relatively asocial and individual-level outcomes (e.g., anxiety, stress,
depression, coping, healthy behaviors, self-esteem) or to dyadic interpersonal processes and, to a
lesser extent, organizational/workplace performance (Barnes, Brown, Krusemark, Campbell, &
Rogge, 2007; Creswell, 2017; Good et al., 2016; Goyal et al., 2014; Kabat‐Zinn, 2003; Laurent,
Hertz, Nelson, & Laurent, 2016; Sedlmeier et al., 2012). While these types of psychological and
group outcomes are undoubtedly important, a disproportionate focus on them can undergird a
type of common critique made against mindfulness practices like meditation, especially in
contexts in which it is secularized or “corporatized” in mainstream culture: that inner-directed
transformative work may ultimately distract attention away from efforts to achieve structural
change and social justice (Comstock, 2015; Lee, 2015; Moore, 2016; Rowe, 2016). Stated
another way, meditation might make you more productive and content, but it is useless for
resolving or fundamentally transforming intergroup conflict and oppression. If this argument is
true, then Krishamurti’s notion of intelligence holds little relevance for addressing phenomena
such as prejudice or political intolerance. Given its focus on intraindividual processes in
interpersonal and intergroup contexts, social psychology may be a more useful approach than
clinical psychology or medicine for testing whether mindfulness can help to quell intergroup
conflict and/or intergroup oppression. However, the concept of mindfulness is only just now
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beginning to be integrated into the existing theoretical frameworks of social psychology, and
there exists very little independent social psychological theorizing that explicates the various
mechanisms of mindfulness or how they relate to social processes (Karremans & Papies, 2017).
(There are some notable exceptions, such the work of Ellen Langer and colleagues, and those are
briefly discussed in the next section.)
The aim of the present research was to replicate and extend the findings of an experiment
by Tincher, Lebois, and Barsalou (2016), which demonstrated a statistically significant reduction
in the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB) effect after a brief laboratory mindfulness intervention. I
chose a conceptual replication attempt rather than a newly-formulated research question for two
reasons. First, Tincher et al.’s experiment represents a growing, but nascent, focus area within
social psychology. In such initial stages of research, it is often useful to seek corroborating
evidence of a basic finding rather than contribute to a profusion of single studies that all have
different methods and outcome measures. Second, the present research was inspired in part by
continuing disquietude among social psychologists regarding low statistical power, publication
bias, and failed replications across many studies and domains (e.g., Earp & Trafimow, 2015;
Maxwell, 2004; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). By
attempting an independent replication of Tincher et al.’s experiment, I was following recent
prescriptions for more direct and conceptual replication within social psychology (Earp &
Trafimow, 2015) while also attempting to connect their findings to a broader ecological context,
namely that of contentious political partisanship.
In the sections that follow, I briefly review research on the construct of mindfulness, with
special attention to how it has been applied to topics such as social cognition, intergroup bias,
and intergroup relations. I then describe Tincher et al.’s (2016) experiment in more detail and
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provide a brief review of the LIB effect. Finally, I provide an overview of the present research,
highlighting my methodological extensions relative to the original Tincher et al. experiment.
Mindfulness: A Social Psychological Review
A common definition of mindfulness is that it represents a state of paying conscious
attention to present-moment experiences with a curious and non-judgmental attitude (KabatZinn, 1990; Karremans & Papies, 2017). While it has roots in religious contemplative practices,
particularly those of Buddhism and Hinduism, Kabat-Zinn (1990) was the first to offer an
operational definition that was stripped of its religious metaphysical content and thus more
conducive to psychological research. Others then began to refine and formalize the concept.
Bishop et al. (2004), for example, suggested that mindfulness is distinct from other kinds of selffocused attention such as rumination or preoccupation. He presented a two-component model to
describe the distinct features of a mindful approach to phenomena: (a) focusing attention on
present-moment experiences, including bodily sensations, thoughts, and emotional states; and (b)
approaching these experiences with a nonjudgmental attitude, irrespective of their valence. The
second of these components is thought to be especially important, since it can often lead to the
insight that all perceptual phenomena are transient experiences, having no fixed, unchanging, or
inherent “essence,” but rather representing slices of a continual ebb and flow of causes and
effects. This insight, in turn, can lead to an attentional perspective shift, most commonly referred
to as “decentering.” To decenter means to stand outside of one’s own experience perceptually,
taking the perspective of a dispassionate observer. Instead of unconsciously identifying with a
thought or emotion, such that one is not even aware of the process of thinking or feeling but of
their experiential products, one stands outside of the thought or feeling, seeing these
psychological processes as such, and realizing that these phenomena are separate from the
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observing self. To go back to Krishamurti’s claim, one is not “evaluating” as such, but rather one
is aware that one is evaluating, which is quite different.
Davidson (2010, p. 10) explicates emotional responses from a decentered perspective:
“Mindfulness training can be hypothesized to change an individual’s relationship to his or her
emotions so that they are not viewed as fundamental constituents of self, but rather as more
fleeting phenomena that appear to the self.” Sedlmeier et al. (2012) note that this has been
referred to by a variety of terms, such as decentering, cognitive defusion, deautomatization, and
disidentification. What all these terms ultimately refer to is a type of perspective-shift that results
in “decoupling the normative relationships between internal experiences and other internal/overt
behavior” (Levin, Luoma, & Haeger, 2015, p. 870). In phenomenological schools of philosophy,
this is similar to the process known as “bracketing,” but in mindfulness it is not so much an
analytical concept as it is an experiential one. The emphasis is on what one empirically realizes
about the nature of phenomena: that there is constant change, no immutable boundaries, and
therefore, an interconnectedness of all things, even things that are seemingly oppositional. This
can be contrasted with an orientation to phenomena in which one assumes that one’s subjective
construals represent the way things “really are,” and that other perspectives must be biased or
incorrect, an orientation that Ross and Ward (1996) termed naïve realism. In juxtaposition,
mindfulness can lead to reduced realism in the sense that one understands that any phenomenon
has multiple perspectives from which it can be viewed; thus, we are all biased, to some extent.
From its religious origins, mindfulness is ultimately about the causes of suffering, and
about freedom from it. The reduced subjective realism and reduced emotional reactivity to
phenomena that are characteristic of mindful states reflect the fact that it ultimately involves a
separation between one’s self and one’s experiences, a separation that highlights one’s freedom
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to respond to experience intentionally versus automatically. Lawrence Barsalou (2017) draws a
parallel between this aspect of intentional versus automatic response in mindfulness and the
various dual-process theories that have arisen in the fields of cognitive and social psychology
over the last several decades. He suggests that the dual-process model of cognition “fits naturally
with contemplative practices” (p. 2) because these practices were designed with the oftenexplicit goal of offering regulatory and reflective tools to counteract habitual, impulsive
cognitive responses. Thus, they can be seen as strengthening “System 2,” or conscious and
controlled, processing, and weakening “System 1,” or implicit and involuntary, processing.
Along similar lines, Elkins-Brown, Teper, and Inzlicht (2017) review evidence that mindfulness
is associated with increased self-control, especially the inhibition of prepotent responses and
desires. They suggest that conflicts between goals and desires often produce negative affect (e.g.,
anxiety), and that mindful attention draws conscious and non-judgmental awareness to this
affect. This, in turn, disrupts automatic responses to the affect and allows one to engage in more
controlled, goal-congruent behavior.
Although the model of mindfulness deriving from Kabat-Zinn (1990) and Bishop et al.
(2004) has become the dominant one within psychological and social-psychological research,
they are not the only theoretical models of mindfulness that have been proposed. A notable
alternative comes the work of Ellen Langer and colleagues, who as early as 1974 developed a
theory of mindfulness and “mindlessness” that is similar to, but also very distinct from, the
construct of mindfulness reviewed above. Sternberg (2000b), for example, summarizes Langer’s
construct of mindfulness as “containing components of (a) openness to novelty; (b) alertness to
distinction; (c) sensitivity to different contexts; (d) implicit, if not explicit, awareness of multiple
perspectives; and (e) orientation in the present” (p. 12). Langer & Moldoveanu (2000) further

MINDFULNESS AND POLITICAL INTERGROUP BIAS

7

state that mindfulness is “best understood as the process of drawing novel distinctions” (p. 1),
and their construct has been used as a means of investigating mindful approaches to learning,
task performance, and decision-making (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000).
A further example of an alternative model of mindfulness was introduced in a paper by
Van Doesum, Van Lange, & Van Lange (2013). The authors developed a construct of “social
mindfulness,” which they define as a desire to maximize other people’s control over their own
outcomes in situations of interdependence. While models such as Langer’s and Van Doesum et
al.’s are instructive, they also have marked conceptual differences from the bulk of psychological
research on mindfulness that I reviewed. Therefore, neither of these approaches were used as
theoretical frameworks for this research.
Mindfulness instruction and measurement. Traditionally, mindfulness has been
studied using a paradigm of an eight-week training program in which participants learn explicit
theories and practices of mindfulness meditation (Alberts, 2017). In these programs, participants
are typically provided with weekly instruction and asked to practice daily outside of training
sessions. This paradigm has the advantage of mimicking how one might learn a meditative
practice in a non-research setting, and it allows the opportunity to carry a mindful orientation
into daily activities as well as formal practice sessions. Such training programs have been
associated with a variety of improvements to clinically-relevant psychological outcomes. 1 More
recently, psychologists have been interested in inducing mindful attentional states in laboratory
settings, which allows more methodological control and precise measurement of the
psychological processes that are involved when mindful attention is used. It also, however, raises
the question of whether, and exactly how, a state of mindfulness can be brought about, and
whether an attentional state is fundamentally the same kind of psychological “thing” as a longer-
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term practice or orientation. For example, if a person who has never meditated before or who has
never heard of mindfulness is asked to listen to a 10-minute guided mindfulness meditation, how
is one to assess whether that person has attained a state of mindfulness? And, once attained, are
these temporary states psychologically equivalent to the kind of mindful cognitive orientation
attained by skilled meditators?
These kinds of questions naturally highlight the need for assessment tools to measure, as
well as possible, the degree of one’s mindfulness. As the above paragraph might suggest,
assessment tools fall into two basic categories: those designed to measure “state” mindfulness,
and those designed to measure “trait,” or dispositional, mindfulness (for reviews, see Baer,
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Baer, 2016; Lau et al., 2006; Park, Reilly-Spong,
& Gross, 2013). While both categories consist almost exclusively of self-report measures, they
are distinguished by the former’s focus on the present moment (or immediate past) and the
latter’s focus on general tendencies or daily habit patterns. While such assessment tools are open
to the same kind of criticism that can be made of any self-report measure of psychological
process, they have had at least one major beneficial effect on the study of mindfulness: the need
for adequate discriminant validity has forced researchers to think more critically about exactly
what the construct of mindfulness is. There is a growing consensus, for example, that
mindfulness is best conceptualized in a multidimensional way. One of the more widely-used trait
mindfulness scales is called the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, Baer et al., 2006;
Baer et al., 2008), and it includes subscales for the following components of mindfulness:
observing, describing, acting with awareness, nonjudging of inner experience, and nonreactivity
to inner experience. It is perhaps noteworthy that in these assessments, the content and social
context of the respondent’s inner experience is not specified. For example, it is difficult to know
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from an FFMQ assessment whether one tends to be differentially mindful when alone or with
others, nor whether mindfulness in different contexts tends to be differentially difficult and/or
effective for facilitating positive social interaction.
Mindfulness and intergroup relations. Rowe (2016) writes about his experience
interviewing activists in New York City who were participating in the Occupy Wall Street
movement after he had read that many of them were using daily group mindfulness meditation
and other mind/body practices to support their activist work. Based on his interviews, he posits
five central ways that these kinds of practices can strengthen social movements (p. 209):
“helping activists prepare for direct action, improving self-care/resilience, transforming trauma,
embodying liberatory values and habits, and improving organizational effectiveness.” Of
particular relevance to the present research is the notion of embodying liberatory values. Rowe
suggests that “mind/body practices such as meditation can help activists notice embodied
thought-patterns and behaviors that interrupt the pursuit of justice” (p. 218). While Rowe was not
experimentally testing a hypothesis, his finding that activists considered mindfulness to be
relevant to their peace work suggests that further empirical investigation is warranted. For
example, can mindful attention to one’s judgments of others reduce the influence of bias on
behavior, and, if so, is this only true if the relevant thoughts/beliefs are consciously attended to,
or might mindful attention more generally allow a person to be less influenced by implicit biases
of any kind, irrespective of whether they are consciously processed? Which specific domains of
intergroup bias or conflict might be most relevant to the kind of emotional regulation and selfcontrol that mindfulness is thought to influence?
Along these lines, Berry and Brown (2017) provide a review of the sparse social
psychological experimental literature on mindfulness and intergroup relations and perception. 2
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They present summaries of several lines of research, observing that “mindfulness fosters nondefensive attitudes toward social outgroup members in three domains: worldview threat,
linguistic intergroup bias, and automatic implicit bias” (p. 156). For example, they review a
study by Niemiec et al. (2010) that showed lower outgroup derogation and lower ingroup
favoritism—both in terms of race and national identity—among dispositionally-mindful
compared to non-dispositionally mindful participants after they were exposed to a mortalitysalience manipulation. They also review a study by Lueke and Gibson (2015), which
demonstrated decreased implicit age and race bias (as measured by the Implicit Association Test,
or IAT) after exposure to a 10-minute auditory-based mindfulness intervention. In this
experiment, the dependent measure consisted of reaction times to photographs of Black versus
White and young versus old faces. It included two control conditions: a group that listened (with
no particular attentional instructions) to a recording that described an English countryside, and
another group that listened to the control recording with explicit instructions to pay close
attention to a particular spoken word. The same authors (Lueke & Gibson, 2016) conducted a
follow-up experiment that indicated reductions in discriminatory behavior in a laboratory “trust
game” after a similar 10-minute mindfulness intervention. Their dependent measure was the
amount of fictional money participants were willing to give to people of different races and
ethnicities when the participants did not know whether the money would be returned. The
experiment included one control condition that consisted of a “filler” audio-recording, similar to
their 2015 experiment. In both the 2015 and 2016 experiments, bias measurements were
completed only once, after the experimental manipulation. Notably, however, in both
experiments, Lueke and Gibson asked all participants—in both experimental and control
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conditions—to complete measures of trait and/or state mindfulness after the manipulation, which
may have influenced control participants’ later responses.
Berry and Brown (2017) also reviewed a series of experimental studies they conducted
that revealed an association between mindfulness and empathic concern and helping behavior,
though as of this writing none of those studies are part of the published record. Of these various
lines of incipient research reviewed by Berry and Brown (2017), the 2016 experiment by Tincher
et al. is most relevant to my present research. A summary of their experiment is provided here, in
which I begin by describing the LIB effect in more detail.
The Linguistic Intergroup Bias effect was introduced by Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin
(1989), and it refers to the tendency for people to use more abstract language when describing a
positive behavior performed by a member of the person’s ingroup, or when describing a negative
behavior performed by a member of the person’s outgroup. The underlying theoretical
framework of this effect is that of the Linguistic Category Model (LCM) (Semin & Fiedler,
1991). The LCM makes a distinction between five categories of interpersonal terms, namely
Descriptive Action Verbs (DAV), Interpretative Action Verbs (IAV), State Action Verbs (SAV),
State Verbs (SV), and Adjectives (ADJ). Each category is progressively less concrete or
descriptive and more abstract or attributional. For example, Semin (2012) provides the following
illustration: A DAV category might be represented by the phrase “A punches B;” the same action
might be described by the IAV phrase “A hurts B;” a yet more abstract description would be the
SAV phrase “A hates B;” and the most abstract characterization would be an ADV phrase such
as “A is aggressive.” In this example, the hypothetical perceiver gives the same action different
interpretations, ones that progress from an emphasis on specific observable events to ones in
which general classes of behaviors or general psychological dispositions are highlighted. The
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LCM posits that language is a cognitive tool used to direct attention to specific aspects of the
environment, and that it implicitly conveys information about the perceiver’s causal inferences
and interpretations.
According to the LCM, abstract language can signify category-based cognition (i.e.,
stereotyped thinking). Thus, language abstraction in an intergroup context is thought to be a
subtle form of implicit stereotyping or bias, and since Maass et al.’s original (1989) publication
on the LIB effect, a growing body of evidence has associated the LIB effect with both ingroup
protection motives as well as differential expectancies. That is, people tend to use more abstract
language as a means of protecting their ingroup identities and esteem, as well as when describing
phenomena that are expected, such as when employing a stereotype (Maass, Milesi, Zabbini, &
Stahlberg, 1995; Maass, Ceccarelli, & Rudin, 1996; Maass, 1999).
Tincher et al. (2016) sought to examine whether mindfulness could reduce this type of
linguistic bias. To test this, they randomly assigned 84 college students to one of four groups: a
mindful attention/friend group, a mindful attention/enemy group, an immersed attention/friend
group, and an immersed attention/enemy group. The “friend” and enemy” refers to whether the
target person in visual stimuli they were exposed to was either the participant’s imagined “best
friend” or “worst enemy.” In other words, when viewing a series of pictures, the participants
were asked to imagine that the person depicted in the picture was their best friend or worst
enemy. The immersed attention condition was distinct from mindful attention condition in that
the former group was instructed to immerse themselves in the visual stimuli and try to “live the
event” that was pictured, whereas the latter group was instructed to use an “observing
perspective” and to notice the transient nature of their thoughts and feelings while they viewed
the same stimuli. Participants were shown cartoon pictures of a target person engaging in diverse
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types of actions (pictures used in prior LIB research, Douglas & Sutton, 2003; Franco & Maass,
1996; Franco & Maass, 1999; Maass et al., 1995). The depicted actions were balanced such that
half of them were positively-valenced (i.e., pro-social) and half were negatively-valenced (i.e.,
anti-social). Some examples of depicted behaviors included picking up trash in a park, hitting
someone, and helping an elderly person across the street. Participants were shown each picture
on a computer screen for 10 seconds, after which a set of four response options appeared
underneath the picture. The four options corresponded to increasingly abstract descriptions of the
behavior, in accordance with the LCM and previous LIB literature (Douglas & Sutton, 2003;
Franco & Maass, 1996; Franco & Maass, 1999).
The authors found that, although the LIB effect could still be observed among the
mindful attention group, it only appeared for positively-valenced behavior (as opposed to both
positive and negative behaviors in the immersed attention condition). Moreover, within positive
behaviors, the LIB effect was significantly attenuated relative to the immersed attention group
(the effect size for the mindful attention condition was gs = 2.15, versus gs = 0.79 for the
immersed attention condition). The authors also found a main effect of condition, such that
participants in the mindful attention group tended to give more concrete descriptive ratings
across target group and behavior valence. These findings held both for participants who had no
prior meditation experience and for those who had.
One important thing to note about most of the studies reviewed by Berry and Brown
(2017), including the experiment by Tincher et al. (2016), is their small sample sizes relative to
the number of conditions in their experimental designs; this raises the concern of low statistical
power. This concern is exacerbated by the fact that little prior empirical or theoretical work can
guide estimates of effect sizes in this area; if effect sizes are small, then small samples will result

MINDFULNESS AND POLITICAL INTERGROUP BIAS

14

in substantially low statistical power. The Niemiec et al. (2010) experiments, for example, had
32 participants per cell in Study 1 and 54 participants per cell in Study 2, using between-subjects
designs in both studies. The Lueke and Gibson (2015) experiment had 28 participants per cell in
a one-factor between-subjects design while their 2016 experiment had a final sample of 31
participants per cell in a mixed design. The Tincher et al. (2016) experiment only included 21
participants per cell in a one-factor (four-level) between-subjects design. On the one hand, it is
possible to argue that if reliable differences between conditions in these experiments obtained
with small sample sizes, then the effect size is likely to be large and therefore should be robust
(see, for example Pashler & Harris, 2012, who address a similar argument). On the other hand,
the law of large numbers implies that one should believe more in effects garnered with larger Ns
than those with smaller Ns (Fraley & Vazire, 2014; Funder et al., 2014; Simmons et al., 2011). If
it is the case that there are many unpublished similar experiments with no reliable effects, then
one must entertain the hypothesis that these published studies with small Ns are the exception
rather than the rule (Pashler & Harris, 2012). This would lead one to conclude that the true effect
size is small to nil. The ambiguity in how to interpret initial results is a strong argument for
replication, and this partially motivated the present research.
The Present Research
The primary goal of the present set of experiments was to perform a conceptual
replication of the basic effect that was observed in Tincher et al.’s experiment. However, I also
wanted to extend their method in several important respects. First, Tincher et al.’s experiment
used an LIB paradigm that is arguably not intergroup in nature. That is, they asked participants to
view cartoon-picture stimuli that represented their “best friend” or “worst enemy.” This approach
was first introduced by researchers who wanted to see if the LIB effect extended beyond the
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boundaries of intergroup categories to the interpersonal level (Douglas & Sutton, 2003; Maass,
1999). While it could be argued that one’s best friend is likely to be a member of one’s own
social group and one’s worst enemy is an outgroup member, it is not always true. I therefore
wanted to use an actual intergroup context, and I wanted to use one that was associated with
relatively intense feelings of hostility, competition, or conflict, since larger LIB effects have
emerged in such contexts in prior research (Maass et al., 1996; Maass, 1999). Given that this
research was being designed at a time characterized by intense political polarization in the
United States—to take just one example, an extremely contentious US presidential campaign and
election was underway—I decided to focus on political ideology as a group membership
distinction (i.e., liberal vs. conservative group belonging).
A second methodological extension involved the dependent measures. Although Tincher
et al.’s study was limited to the LIB effect, I wanted to see if a similar effect could be observed
for a related, but distinct, intergroup bias outcome. I chose a phenomenon known as
infrahumanization, which refers to the tendency for ingroup members to consider outgroup
members as less human than their own group, either explicitly (e.g., derogating an outgroup as
“animals” or animal-like) or implicitly through subtle cues (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Leyens
et al., 2001; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). Infrahumanization is
considered to be a variant or sub-class of a broader phenomenon known as dehumanization, and
a great deal of empirical and theoretical development has occurred in this area over the last two
decades (for recent reviews, see Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016; Vaes,
Leyens, Paola Paladino, & Pires Miranda, 2012). The theoretical model of infrahumanization is
one in which ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation are combined through a person’s
assumptions of psychological essentialism, or the belief that social groups are defined by
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essential substance rather than by contingency or social construction. Because of this, the same
underlying motives thought to drive the LIB effect (viz., ingroup-protection and intergroup
expectancies) could also motivate one to infrahumanize outgroups, since both phenomena rely
on essentialist beliefs about the inherent nature of groups. Moreover, the emphases in
mindfulness on non-judgment and the deconstruction of essentialist beliefs should, in theory,
directly undermine this foundation and should lead one to view others in more concrete and
“objective” terms (e.g., we are all uniquely human and no group is inherently inclined to be good
or bad or to necessarily behave in good or bad ways).
A search of the literature revealed at least two recent investigations of
infrahumanization/dehumanization of political outgroup members. Pacilli, Roccato, Pagliaro, and
Russo (2016) found in a community-based correlational study and an experiment that level of
political ingroup identification (i.e., left- and right-wing groups in Italy) and the salience of the
ingroup membership influenced explicit animalistic dehumanization of the outgroup, and that
this was mediated through perceptions of greater moral distance between the ingroup and
outgroup. In another study using different methods and a different theoretical model of
dehumanization, Crawford, Modri, and Motyl (2013) found that participants applied Human
Nature (HN) and Human Uniqueness (HU) traits in different ways to liberals versus
conservatives, and that these attributions mirrored common political stereotypes. Both liberals
and conservatives more strongly associated their ingroup with stereotype-consistent positive
traits (e.g., “Passionate” and “Trusting” for liberals; “Humble” and “Organized” for
conservatives) and their outgroup with stereotype-consistent negative traits (e.g., “Nervous” and
“Aggressive” for liberals; “Cold” and “Stingy” for conservatives).
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Considering these studies, and the fact that Leyens et al. (2007) report that
infrahumanization effects have been found in contexts ranging as widely as minimal group
paradigms to competing university departments, it seemed reasonable to expect at least some
amount of infrahumanization of political rivals in contemporary US culture. For the present
study, I decided to use a relatively simple version of the infrahumanization paradigm, wherein
the participant is asked to assign words that convey primary emotions (i.e., those common to all
animals) and secondary emotions (i.e., uniquely-human) to the ingroup and outgroup. A bias in
assigning more relatively primary versus secondary emotions to the outgroup than one does to
the ingroup is taken as evidence of infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2007). This measure is
considered implicit because participants do not spontaneously infer which emotions are generally
considered primary and secondary by the lay public. Infrahumanization is said to occur when the
participant assigns fewer secondary emotions to the outgroup, thereby assigning them less
emotional sophistication and nuance (i.e., more like animals).
A third methodological difference of the present research from Tincher et al.’s study
involves the experimental control conditions. Whereas Tincher et al. used a mindful attention
condition compared to an immersed attention condition, I added an additional no treatment
control condition (i.e., participants who went through the same procedure, but did not receive
any attentional instructions to follow related to the stimuli). This additional control allows
several alternative hypotheses concerning Tincher et al.’s experiment to be addressed, such as
that being immersed in the stimuli increases the LIB and infrahumanization effects, rather than
mindful attention decreasing them. It is useful to consider both types of controls, especially
immersion since it represents an “active” control, where the participant thoroughly and closely
processes the stimuli, but differs only in the specific attentional component of interest. Moreover,
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in real-world contexts, conflict-prone or hostile intergroup relations are often characterized by
immersive experiences of rumination, emotional reactivity, and sometimes complete personal
fusion with the ingroup (Borders, Earleywine, & Jajodia, 2010; Fredman et al., 2015; Keltner &
Lerner, 2010).
The final methodological extension involved the frequency of attentional practice trials
and the presence versus absence of specific instructions immediately prior to the critical stimuli.
Tincher et al.’s study only used one set of practice stimuli for the LIB, and they instructed
participants to apply their attentional instructions explicitly to the critical stimuli. In the present
studies, I provided more opportunities to practice the attentional instructions prior to the
presentation of the critical stimuli, and I did so using a wider variety of stimulus modalities (e.g.,
pictures, audio, and text). In addition, while participants were reminded of their attentional
instructions prior to viewing the LIB stimuli, they were not reminded prior to the subsequent
infrahumanization stimuli. These modifications arguably increase the strength of the mindfulness
manipulation and offer the opportunity to observe a “carryover” effect from the instructions.
Experiment 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether a mindfulness intervention would
reduce linguistic intergroup bias and infrahumanization toward political outgroup members. The
experiment consisted of a mixed factorial experimental design, with one between-subjects factor
(attentional instructions) and three within-subjects factors (the group-membership of the target
stimulus, the positive/negative valence of the stimuli, and, for the infrahumanization measure,
the type of emotion selected). Participants were assigned to one of three instruction conditions to
compare mindfulness with two other control conditions, and then practiced those instructions
with exposure to evocative photographs. Following that, they completed two measures of
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intergroup bias. The dependent variables were the degree of language abstraction used to
describe ingroup vs. outgroup valenced behaviors, and the participants’ distribution of primary
versus secondary emotional attributions toward their ingroup versus outgroup. All data were
collected on individual computer terminals in a psychology laboratory.
Method
Sample and participant selection. I did not conduct a formal power analysis to
determine sample size for either of the two experiments in this research because the published
literature is too sparse to be sure of an effect size. My strategy was rather to choose a reasonablylarge sample size relative to prior research in this area while balancing time and resource
constraints. Thus, the intended sample size was 180 participants, or 60 per cell for the threelevel, between-subjects factor. The final sample was larger than this target, though this increase
was not due to extensions of stopping rules or attempts to achieve statistical significance, but
rather the desire to achieve the largest sample within the available time.
Two hundred nine students, recruited from an undergraduate participant pool at a large
public northeastern university in the United States, participated in the study in exchange for
course credit. Recruitment and data collection took place during the month of April, 2017.
During recruitment, a prescreen filter was used to exclude from eligibility those who had
previously reported no political affiliation during a mass prescreening session held during the
first week of the semester (i.e., those who answered neither to the question “When it comes to
politics in general, where do you place yourself on this scale?” (Response options included
extremely liberal, quite liberal, slightly liberal, neither, slightly conservative, quite conservative,
extremely conservative). While the participant’s political ingroup was not an explicit factor in the
experimental design—I was interested in the distinction between one’s political ingroup and
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outgroup and not between liberals and conservatives per se—the disproportionate number of
liberals in the participant pool created the possibility that the sample would be very highly
skewed toward liberals. Thus, to ensure that I had a reasonable number of conservatives in the
sample, I used two different recruitment efforts, one directed at conservative participants and one
directed at liberals. Note that this did not result in an equal n between groups, however.
Of the 209 who participated, two participants were excluded from data analysis. One
participant did not complete the entire experiment, so those data were excluded. A second
participant was excluded because of obvious straight-lining in their responses across all
questions. In addition, a third participant completed the experiment twice, so the data from that
participant’s second instance were excluded. Removing these three participant records resulted in
a final sample of 207 participants (60.4% female; Mage = 19.2 years, SDage = 2.4 years, age range:
17-49 years). Of the 207 participants, 56 (27.1%) self-identified as conservative and 151 (73.0%)
self-identified as liberal. Participants were all randomly assigned to one of the three experimental
conditions, and due to the three aforementioned exclusions, this led to a slightly imbalanced
design: n = 70 in the no instruction condition; n = 68 in the immersion condition; and n = 69 in
the mindfulness condition.
Nineteen participants (9.2%) failed at least one attention check that had been included in
the experiment (e.g., a dummy question asking participants to select a specific response option,
etc.). All analyses were conducted by both including and excluding these 19 participants, and
none of the results substantively changed when they were included or excluded. Therefore, these
participants were left in the sample for all data analyses.
Procedure. The entire experiment was conducted on the Qualtrics survey platform,
including recorded and written instructions, random assignment to conditions, presentation of
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stimuli, and the collection of participants’ responses. Upon arrival, participants were greeted by
an experimenter and led to an enclosed room where they could sit at a computer and complete
the session in isolation (i.e., no one else was in the room during the session, including the
experimenter). Participants were asked to turn off any cell phones or other devices they had with
them, to use no other programs on the computer, and to pay exclusive attention to the experiment
while they were present. The session began with an informational screen that described the aim
of the study as “to deepen our understanding of how attentional processes and personality
characteristics affect the way people react to the world around them,” but did not mention
mindfulness or the specific hypotheses being tested. It further explained that as part of the study,
they would be asked to provide their impressions of a variety of words and pictures.
The computer program then randomly assigned the participant to one of the three
experimental or control conditions (the between-subjects factor in this experiment). This method
ensured a “double-blind” process in which neither the participant nor the experimenter knew
who was assigned to what condition. Each participant was then asked to indicate their political
ideological affiliation and level of associated ingroup identification. This included the following
forced-choice question: “If you had to choose, to what extent would you say that you are
conservative or liberal in your overall political views?” The response option for the question was
a 6-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (extremely liberal) to 6 (extremely conservative) and
no neutral or undecided option. Responses between 1 and 3 resulted in a participant ingroup
assignment of “liberal,” while responses between 4 and 6 resulted in an assignment of
“conservative.” This ingroup assignment was transparent to the participant and was used by the
computer program for subsequent routing and stimuli presentation. Each participant then
completed a 14-item ingroup identification scale.
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Depending on the experimental assignment, participants were then presented with
attentional instructions (i.e., mindful attention, immersed attention, or no instruction), which
were both presented with on-screen text and through an embedded audio clip in which the onscreen instructions were read aloud. For the immersion and mindfulness conditions, verbatim
wording was used as from the Tincher et al. 2016 experiment (exact wording can be found in
Appendix A). For example, the immersed-attention condition asked participants to “live the
experience,” “travel in time to the event,” and “project yourself into it,” trying to experience it in
vivid detail, where “it almost seems real to you.” The mindfulness condition, by contrast, asked
participants to use an “observing perspective” in which they are reminded to consider their
thoughts and reactions as “transitory, fleeting mental states” that arise and dissipate. They were
not asked to avoid or suppress their thoughts, but to simply remain aware of them. The word
“mindfulness” or its derivations were not used in the instructions. It is important to note that this
was not an interactive exercise nor a guided meditation, but simply a set of instructions about
how to pay attention. There were also no opportunities to ask clarifying questions. For the noinstructions condition, participants were simply asked to view the pictures, and were told that we
would be asking questions about them after they viewed them. Instructions for all three
conditions were recorded by the same person (i.e., the author, who had no formal training in
intervention delivery) and delivered in a similar intonation, style of speech, and–except for the
no instruction condition–duration (the immersed-attention clip duration was one minute and
forty-seven seconds; the mindful-attention clip duration was one minute and forty-nine seconds,
and the no-instructions clip duration was twelve seconds).
Participants were asked to apply their attentional instructions to two politically-neutral
practice photographs, which were presented for 10-seconds each. When participants were ready
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to continue, a series of twelve political/social-themed practice photographs was presented, each
picture showing for 10 seconds.
After viewing the pictures, depending on their experimental group, participants were
asked to complete manipulation-check questions (i.e., selected questions from the Toronto
Mindfulness Scale, as well as several follow-up questions related to their attentional process and
affective response, described in next section). They then received a brief reminder about the
attentional instructions they were to practice, but they were now asked to apply them while
reading a short paragraph. For example, in the immersion condition, they were instructed: “As
you read [the paragraph], please remember to continue to completely immerse yourself in the
text. That is, remember to try and live the experience by projecting yourself into it and
experiencing it in vivid detail. You experience it almost as if it someone were actually speaking
to you right now.” In the mindfulness condition, they were instructed, “As you read [the
paragraph], please remember to continue to apply the ‘observing perspective.’ That is, remember
to notice your thoughts and reactions to the words, trying not to avoid or suppress them. Just
remain aware that they’re thoughts and reactions, and observe them as mental states that arise
and dissipate.” The paragraph consisted of a hostile message, allegedly written by members of
the political outgroup, and that disparaged the ingroup. After reading the paragraph, participants
were once again asked the manipulation check questions.
Participants were then provided with instructions related to eight LIB stimulus pictures
(described in the next section). Prior to beginning, the participants were given a final brief
reminder of the attentional instructions they were to apply while viewing the pictures. The LIB
pictures indicated that the main protagonist was either a “liberal” or conservative.” The eight
pictures were presented in two randomized blocks of four pictures (i.e., either the four liberal-
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target pictures or the four conservative-target pictures were presented first), and within each
block, the four pictures were randomized. Each picture appeared for 10 seconds, after which four
descriptions appeared beneath the cartoon, and participants were asked to “select the description
that best represents what is occurring in that scene.”
After viewing and rating the LIB stimuli, participants were presented with a randomlyordered list of the 20 infrahumanization emotion words. They were asked to select the words that
they felt are typical characteristics of liberals/conservatives (they repeated this exercise twice,
once for each target group, and the order was randomized). After this task was completed,
participants completed a dispositional mindfulness questionnaire, and they were asked to indicate
their level of experience with meditation before they were debriefed.
Stimuli and measures.
Attentional practice and ingroup threat stimuli. A series of photographs selected from
the internet was used to provide a focus for attentional practice during the experiment. First, two
non-political photographs were presented: an image of one person helping another person who
had fallen in the snow, and a close-up image of a tarantula spider. The two photographs were
used to provide an orientation and practice to the task of visually attending to pictures, and their
non-political nature helped to mask the overall purpose of this part of the experiment. After this
presentation, twelve photographs were presented that depicted scenes of contemporary political
or social issues/events, such as images of the Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street, and
Women’s March protests, the inaugurations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, a grouppicture of members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a Palestinian activist throwing a
stone, and a Mexican immigrants’ rights activist confronting a counter-protester. These scenes
were selected based solely on my subjective impression of their emotional content and relevance
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to current events, and their purpose in the experiment was twofold: to evoke an emotional
response of some kind (irrespective of valence or cognitive content) and to provide a focus of
attention. The assumption was that by visually focusing on evocative political and social
pictures, participants’ own political views and group membership would be made salient.
In addition, I asked participants to read a paragraph ostensibly written by a member of
their political outgroup, which disparaged the ingroup by employing several insulting
stereotypes. Like the preceding pictures, this stimulus was presented to provide another focus for
attentional instructions. However, this stimulus was also intended to produce a sense of ingroup
threat, since prior research has suggested that such a threat can increase the LIB effect (Maass et
al., 1996). Two versions of the paragraph were created (one focused on liberals and one on
conservatives), and they were balanced for number and structure of words/sentences, wording
complexity, and topical content. The full text of the paragraphs can be found in Appendix B.
Linguistic Intergroup Bias. To measure the LIB effect, I included a set of stimuli that
has been used in previous research (e.g., Douglas & Sutton, 2003; Franco & Maass, 1996;
Tincher et al., 2016). These stimuli consist of single-frame cartoon pictures that illustrate a
protagonist–clearly labeled in the picture with the letter A–engaging in a specific behavior. The
depicted behaviors are designed to be easily recognized as positive or negative in terms of
valence, and sometimes show the protagonist interacting with another person or acting alone.
Examples of positive behaviors include picking up trash at park, helping an elderly woman
across the street, and helping an injured basketball player off the ground. Examples of negative
behaviors include littering, spray-painting on a wall, and hitting another person.
Each picture was accompanied by a set of four response options (multiple choice), and
the participant was asked to choose the description that most accurately represents the action

MINDFULNESS AND POLITICAL INTERGROUP BIAS

26

being portrayed in the picture. The four available description choices, in turn, represented
increasing levels of linguistic abstraction, and they were always presented with the most concrete
description listed first and the most abstract listed last.
I used the same set of eight stimulus pictures used by Tincher et al. (2016) (see Appendix
C). The pictures were balanced for valence, where half depicted positive behaviors and half
depicted negative behaviors. However, in this experiment I made one modification to the stimuli:
as each picture was presented to the participant, a text label above the picture read either “Person
A is a liberal” or “Person A is a conservative.” To minimize confounding between this
conservative/liberal attribute and any other specific attribute of a given picture, I created two
versions of the eight LIB stimulus pictures. Version A paired the “conservative” label with two
specific positive and two specific negative behaviors and paired the “liberal” label with the
remaining two positive and two negative behaviors. Version B reversed this pairing, such that the
“conservative” label was paired with the behaviors that were paired with “liberal” in Version A,
and vice-versa for the “conservative” label. Each participant was then randomly assigned to be
presented one of the two LIB stimuli versions.
To calculate the dependent measure of language abstraction, the average of each
participant’s two ratings within valence and target group was calculated to produce a set of four
average language abstraction scores for each participant: positive ingroup behavior, negative
ingroup behavior, positive outgroup behavior, and negative outgroup behavior. These four scores
comprised the two within-subjects factors of target group membership and behavior valence.
Infrahumanization. The experiment included procedures and stimuli that have been used
in prior research to measure infrahumanization (e.g., Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002, p.
108, Table 1). Participants were presented with a randomized list of 20 different emotions that
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were balanced for positive/negative valence and primary/secondary emotional categorization (the
full list can be seen in Table 3). Participants were presented with the same list of words twice.
On the first trial, they were asked to select from the list all the words that they consider to be
typical characteristics for either liberals or conservatives. The second trial repeated the
instruction, but the target group was switched. The target group presentation order was
randomized. The two additional within-subjects factors of emotion valence and emotion type
were formed by creating four sub-scores for each trial: the number of positive primary emotions
selected, the number positive secondary emotions selected, the number of negative primary
emotions selected, and the number of negative secondary emotions selected.
Manipulation checks. As a means of ensuring that the mindfulness instructions had the
intended effect, I used four items from the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Lau et al., 2006). The
Toronto Mindfulness Scale is a 13-item Likert-type rating scale that assesses retrospective
curiosity and decentering towards one’s experience. As such, it is a self-report measure of state
mindfulness. Response options range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Two representative
items from the Curiosity subscale were selected to use for this experiment: “I was curious about
my reactions to things” and “I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was
having” (α = .83). Two representative items from the Decentering subscale were also selected: “I
was more concerned with being open to my experiences than controlling or changing them” and
“I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily accurate reflection
of the way things ‘really’ are” (α = .51, indicating that these two items were not necessarily
capturing the same dimension of decentering). In addition, all conditions included several
questions related to the extent to which the participant could follow the instructions, how
difficult it was for them to do so, and various aspects of how they felt while experiencing the
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stimuli. These questions, along with their descriptive statistics, are listed in Table 2. Each
manipulation check item was analyzed separately (i.e., no additive subscales were created).
Covariates. Several covariates were included in the experiment to simultaneously allow
for the reduction of error variance (by including them as only main effects in the statistical
model) and to test the potential of theoretically interesting moderators (by also including their
interactions with the independent variables). The only a priori directional hypotheses connected
to these covariates were general predictions that higher ingroup identification and social
dominance orientation would be associated with higher intergroup bias and that trait mindfulness
would be associated with lower intergroup bias.
Ingroup identification. I included a 14-item Likert-type scale measure of ingroup
identification developed by Leach et al. (2008). The scale measures two primary dimensions of
ingroup identification (self-investment and self-definition), which are further broken down into
five components: solidarity, satisfaction, centrality, individual self-stereotyping, and ingroup
homogeneity. All items include response options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree) and include statements such as “I am glad to be a/an [ingroup]; The fact that I
am a/an [ingroup] is an important part of my identity; I am similar to the average [ingroup]
person;” and so forth. A useful feature of the scale is that it is designed to be adapted to any
intergroup context. In this experiment, the “[ingroup]” component of each question was
programmatically replaced to match whichever political ideology group the participant reported
being most strongly identifying with. This measure was included for two reasons. First, it
represented a convenient way to make the participants’ political identification salient within the
context of the experiment. Second, since degree of ingroup identification is known to moderate
intergroup bias and infrahumanization, it was important to investigate any moderating influences
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on the variables in this experiment (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Maass, 1999). For the analyses
in this report, a composite ingroup identification score was calculated by taking the average
response to all 14 items. Cronbach’s α for all 14 items was .90.
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Social Dominance Orientation is a measure of an
individual's preference for hierarchy within a social system, as well as domination over lowerstatus groups. It is correlated positively with political conservatism and negatively with empathy
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). SDO has also been identified as “the most
replicated ideological correlate of dehumanization” (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014, p. 410). It is
therefore a useful measure to include in the present study as a covariate, since by doing so it is
possible to not only control for independent effects of SDO on intergroup bias, but also to test for
potential moderation effects. A mass-testing prescreening questionnaire (completed several
months prior to the experiment) included four items corresponding to the short-form version of
the Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto et al., 2014). The average response to the four
items was used to calculate a composite index of SDO. Cronbach’s α for the four items was .77.
Trait-Mindfulness and Experience with Meditation. Dispositional or trait mindfulness
has been shown to moderate the effects of brief mindfulness interventions, at least on
physiological measures (e.g., Laurent, Laurent, Nelson, Wright, & De, 2015). As such, it is a
useful covariate to consider in the present study. I included the Five Facet Mindfulness
Questionnaire–Short Form (FFMQ-SF, Bohlmeijer, Klooster, Fledderus, Veehof, & Baer, 2011).
This scale is a 24-item Likert-type self-report rating of various skills associated with
mindfulness. It represents a shortened version of the scale developed by Baer et al. (2006). For
analyses in this report, I calculated a composite score by taking the average response to all 24
items. Cronbach’s α for all 24 items was .79. Additionally, at the end of the experiment,
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participants were asked to indicate whether, and to what extent, they have had any experience
with meditation.
Results
Descriptives and distributional assumptions. In general, language abstraction ratings
were on the low end of the scale, with a distribution that had some positive skew and a very high
peak, (M = 1.75, Mdn = 1.5, SD = 0.66 on a scale from 1 to 4). The distribution for the count of
emotions selected in each infrahumanization trial was also somewhat positively skewed, with a
peak near 5 but also a peak at the maximum range, as several participants selected all 20
available emotions (M = 6.16, Mdn = 5.0, SD = 2.52). To examine assumptions regarding
homogeneity of variance, I compared the variance of both dependent measures across
experimental groups and across participant political ingroup membership. Differences in
variance were well within reasonable ranges.
Of the three continuous-measure covariates, the ingroup identification composite measure
had a negative significant correlation with SDO, r = -.23, p < .001, though this is likely
explained by the disproportionate number of liberals in the sample. Separate regressions revealed
that being more highly-identified with liberal political ideology was associated with lower SDO
(b = -0.305, p < .001) whereas being more highly identified with conservative ideology was
associated with higher SDO (b = 0.190, p = .122). Trait mindfulness was not significantly
correlated with either ingroup identification or SDO. Table 1 lists the means, standard deviations,
and other descriptive information about the covariate measures. Note that slightly more than a
third of the sample reported having some prior meditation experience (whether mindfulness
meditation or some other type), which is relatively high compared to recent estimates of the
general U.S population (Clarke, Black, Stussman, Barnes, & Nahin, 2015). This proportion did
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not differ substantially between liberal and conservative participants (33.9% vs. 35.8%,
respectively), χ2(1) = 0.013, p = .91. Interestingly, reported prior meditation experience was not
related to statistically significant differences in trait mindfulness, with means of 3.31 (SD = 0.37)
for those with prior meditation experience and 3.24 (SD = 0.37) for those with no prior
meditation experience, t(1, 204) = 1.32, p = .19.
To examine differences in degree of political ingroup identification between liberal and
conservative participants, I used two comparisons. First, I calculated the average difference from
the mid-point of 3.5 that conservative and liberal participants rated themselves on the six-point
political identification question. On average, conservative participants were 0.95 points away
from the mid-point of the scale (in the conservative direction), whereas liberal participants were
1.30 points away from the mid-point of the scale (in the liberal direction). In other words, liberal
participants in the sample reported being more highly liberal on average than conservatives
reported being highly conservative, t(1, 205) = -3.89, p < .001. However, the difference in
overall political ingroup identification—using the 14-item measure—between liberal and
conservative participants, although having the same direction, did not reach the significance
threshold. The mean for liberal participants on this measure was 4.75, whereas the mean for
conservative participants was 4.50, t(1, 205) = -1.95, p = .053.
Manipulation checks. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 12 manipulationcheck items that participants responded to. Note that some items, such as items 1 through 4 from
the Toronto Mindfulness Scale, were not asked of all participants, but only those in relevant
experimental conditions (see Table 2 caption for further detail). For the most part, means were in
the expected direction. For example, participants indicated that they had, on average, moderateto-high levels of affect and interest in response to the political pictures and disparaging
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paragraph (items 6 and 11), and they reported relatively high levels of being able to continuously
follow the attentional instructions and that it was relatively easy to do so (items 7 and 8).
Importantly, there was some evidence to suggest that the attempt to elicit mindfulness in
this experiment was not as successful as one might hope. For example, items from the Toronto
Mindfulness Scale (items 1 through 4 in Table 2), such as the statements “I was more concerned
with being open to my experiences than controlling or changing them” and “I experienced my
thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily accurate reflection of the way things
‘really’ are” were presented to participants in the mindfulness condition after they viewed the
political pictures and ingroup-threat paragraph. Responses to these questions showed only
modest levels of agreement and had relatively normal and centered distributions, suggesting that
at least a subset of the participants in the mindfulness condition were not experiencing curiosity
or decentering regarding the stimuli. This was especially evident after reading the ingroupthreatening message, in which an outgroup member verbally disparages the ingroup.
Interestingly, a number of participants in the mindfulness condition did not agree, or only agreed
“a little” with the statement that their thoughts were not an “accurate reflection of the way things
‘really’ are,” which suggests that many participants were identified with their beliefs about the
outgroup; that is, they found the stereotyped messages coming from the outgroup member as
plausible and reflective of reality.
Linguistic intergroup bias. An a priori Type I error rate of 0.05 was used for all
inferential analyses in these experiments. To analyze responses to the LIB stimuli, I conducted a
2 (stimulus target’s group membership: ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (stimulus target’s behavior
valence: positive vs. negative) × 3 (attentional instructions: no instructions, immersion, or
mindfulness) mixed factorial ANOVA; the first two variables were within-subjects. 3 The
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hypothesis of interest consisted of the three-way interaction among these factors. However, the
omnibus interaction effect was non-significant, F(2, 204) < 1, p = .865, ηG2 = .0003, ηP2 = .0001.
Figure 1 depicts the estimated means for this interaction (error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals). Importantly, the two-way interaction between the target group membership and
behavior valence was also non-significant, F(1, 204) = 2.38, p = .125, ηG2 = .002, ηP2 = .011,
suggesting that the LIB effect did not occur, even in the two control conditions. To confirm that
mindfulness condition had no effect, the analysis was repeated both by combining the two
control conditions and comparing them to the mindfulness condition, as well as by only
including the two control conditions. In none of these analyses did the expected target group ×
valence interaction appear.
The only statistically significant effect in the model was the main effect of stimulus
valence, F(1, 204) = 9.57, p = .002, ηG2 = .008, ηP2 = .045. Negative behaviors received more
abstract language ratings than positive behaviors, with means and 95% confidence intervals
respectively of 1.80 [1.73, 1.88] versus 1.69 [1.61, 1.76]. However, this result is not particularly
relevant to the research hypotheses.
As a follow-up analysis, I reran the same repeated measures ANOVA several times, each
time including one of the covariates—prior meditation experience, trait mindfulness, SDO, and
ingroup identification score—testing both main effects and their interactions with other factors.
Neither controlling for these covariates nor including their interactions with other factors
revealed any further statistically significant effects for linguistic abstraction scores. In other
words, there were no significant main or interaction effects involving any of the covariates, nor
did controlling for them change the outcome of the previous analyses.
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As a further way of assessing whether the LIB effect was elicited in any condition, I
created a single metric of the LIB effect by taking the average of two subscores: the language
abstraction score for ingroup positive behaviors subtracted by that of ingroup negative behaviors,
and the language abstraction score for outgroup negative behaviors subtracted by outgroup
positive behaviors. This resulted in a zero-centered score that had positive values if the LIB
effect was elicited toward either the ingroup, outgroup, or both. The overall mean of this new
measure was 0.06 (SD = 0.55), and the maximum mean difference between experimental
conditions was 0.05. Thus, the LIB effect was virtually non-existent in this experiment.
Infrahumanization. To analyze responses to the infrahumanization stimuli, I conducted
a 2 (target’s group membership: ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (emotion type: primary vs. secondary)
× 2 (emotion valence: positive vs. negative) × 3 (attentional instructions: no instructions,
immersion, or mindfulness) mixed factorial ANOVA; the first three variables were withinsubjects. The hypothesis of interest consisted of the three-way interaction among target group,
emotion type, and attentional instructions. The omnibus interaction effect was non-significant,
F(2, 204) < 1, p = .789, ηG2 = .0001, ηP2 = .002 (shown in Figure 2). There was, however, a
relatively large two-way significant interaction between target group and emotion type, F(1, 204)
= 84.16, p < .001, ηG2 = .023, ηP2 = .292, and an inspection of the means revealed a consistent
pattern of infrahumanization across experimental conditions (this can be seen in Figure 2).
Participants consistently rated the outgroup as having fewer secondary emotions than the ingroup
(means of 2.39 vs. 3.64, respectively), whereas they rated the outgroup as having more primary
emotions than the ingroup (means of 3.43 vs. 2.87, respectively). Simple effects tests showed
that the effect of target group was significant within only secondary emotions, F(1, 204) = 87.67,
p < .001, ηG2 = .062, ηP2 = .300, as well as within only primary emotions, F(1, 204) = 22.80, p <
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.001, ηG2 = .012, ηP2 = .100. The main effect of target group was also significant, F(1, 204) =
19.66, p < .001, ηG2 = .003, ηP2 = .090. On average, participants attributed a greater number of
emotions to the ingroup than the outgroup (means of 6.51 vs. 5.82, respectively).
There were also three significant effects associated with the valence of the emotions. The
main effect of valence was significant, F(1, 204) = 38.69, p < .001, ηG2 = .016, ηP2 = .159.
Across other factors, participants tended to select more positive than negative emotions.
However, two interactions qualified this effect. First, there was significant two-way interaction
between emotion valence and target group, F(1, 204) = 121.46, p < .001, ηG2 = .068, ηP2 = .373.
That is, participants attributed more positive emotions to their ingroup (M = 4.42 for ingroup and
2.48 for outgroup) and more negative emotions to the outgroup (M = 2.09 for ingroup and 3.33
for outgroup), independent of whether those emotions were primary or secondary in nature.
Second, there was a significant two-way interaction between emotion valence and emotion type,
F(1, 204) = 42.28, p < .001, ηG2 = .010, ηP2 = .172. Independent of target group, participants
tended to select more negative primary emotions (M = 3.07) than negative secondary emotions
(M = 2.35), and they tended to select fewer positive primary emotions (M = 3.23) than positive
secondary emotions (M = 3.67). No other main effects or interactions in the model were reliable,
ps > .08.
As a follow-up exploratory analysis, the participant’s political ingroup (liberal,
conservative) was added to the model. While there were still no effects associated with the
experimental manipulation, the participant’s ingroup was found to moderate the
infrahumanization effect described above. That is, the three-way interaction between the
participant’s political ingroup, the target group, and the type of emotion was significant, F(1,
201) = 32.66, p < .001, ηG2 = .008, ηP2 = .140. Inspection of the means for each group revealed
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that although conservative participants had virtually no differences in the average number of
emotions they selected across the target group and emotion type, liberal participants’ distribution
of emotions showed a reliable pattern of attributing more primary emotions and fewer secondary
to the outgroup (conservatives) relative to the ingroup (liberals). This finding seems to suggest
that the infrahumanization effect was limited to liberals’ ratings of conservatives and not vice
versa.
However, this three-way interaction was further qualified by a significant four-way
interaction that included emotional valence. In other words, the interaction between the
participant’s political ingroup, emotion valence, emotion type, and target group was significant,
though the effect size was relatively small, F(1, 201) = 4.28, p = .04, ηG2 = .001, ηP2 = .021. This
interaction is best conveyed visually (see Figure 3). Figure 3 shows the average number of
selected emotions by emotion type and participant ingroup, but the top chart includes only
positive emotions whereas the bottom chart includes only negative ones. For positive emotions,
conservative participants on average attributed fewer secondary emotions to the outgroup, but
the effect was much smaller than for liberal participants.
To decompose this four-way interaction, a series of four simple effects tests were
performed to examine how the two-way interaction between target group and emotion type
varied as a function of emotion valence and the participant’s ingroup. For conservative
participants only, the two-way interaction between target group and emotion type was not
significant for either positive emotions, F(1, 55) < 1, p = .71, ηG2 = .0002, ηP2 = .003, or for
negative emotions, F(1, 55) < 1, p = .50, ηG2 = .0009, ηP2 = .008. In other words, while the
pattern of means among conservatives was consistent with an infrahumanization effect (see
Figure 3), the differences were not large enough to be considered statistically significant.
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However, for liberal participants only, the two-way interaction between target group and emotion
type was significant for both positive emotions, F(1, 150) = 103.9, p < .001, ηG2 = .060, ηP2 =
.409 and for negative emotions, F(1, 150) = 45.2, p < .001, ηG2 = .028, ηP2 = .231. Additional
simple effects tests revealed that for liberal participants, the difference in how they attributed
primary and secondary emotions to the ingroup versus outgroup was significant in all cases
except for negative secondary emotions. For example, for positive secondary emotions, liberals
attributed significantly fewer emotions to the outgroup (M = 0.83) than the ingroup (M = 2.70),
F(1, 150) = 207.15, p < .001, ηG2 = .031, ηP2 = .580 (and note that this effect size was over six
times larger than among conservative participants, who had an effect size of ηP2 = .093 for the
same comparison; see the second and fourth set of columns in the top panel of Figure 3).
Additionally, liberal participants attributed fewer positive primary emotions to conservatives,
though the effect size was small, F(1, 150) = 13.8, p < .001, ηG2 = .016, ηP2 = .080, and they
attributed more negative primary emotions to conservatives F(1, 150) = 86.8, p < .001, ηG2 =
.133, ηP2 = .367.
To simplify further exploratory covariate analyses, I reduced the number of factors
involved by converting the dependent measure into a single metric of infrahumanization.
Informed by the previous results, I did this by subtracting the number of positive secondary
emotions attributed to the outgroup from the number attributed to the ingroup. This created a
zero-centered score in which positive values indicated infrahumanization. This new index acted
as the dependent measure in a series of models that tested for the effects of ingroup
identification, SDO, meditation experience, and trait mindfulness. Of these analyses, the only
additional statistically significant result relevant to the experimental design was a positive
relationship between ingroup identification and infrahumanization, F(1, 195) = 27.15, p < .001,
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ηG2 = .122, ηP2 = .122, b = 0.768. In other words, after controlling for the main effects and
interactions among experimental condition and the participant’s ingroup, the main effect of
ingroup identification explained slightly more than 12% of the variance in the infrahumanization
effect. Participants’ political ingroup did not moderate this effect (i.e., the relationship was
positive for both liberal and conservative participants).
Importantly, these models also revealed that the effect of the participant’s political
ingroup on infrahumanization was still significant after controlling for each of the different
covariates (i.e., meditation experience, trait mindfulness, SDO, and ingroup identification). For
example, the difference between liberals’ and conservatives’ level of infrahumanization of the
outgroup was still significant after controlling for two different measures of political ingroup
identification: the participants’ degree of difference from the mid-point score of the political
identification question, F(1, 200) = 17.61, p < .001, ηG2 = .080, ηP2 = .080, and the 14-item
composite measure of political ingroup identification, F(1, 195) = 23.57, p < .001, ηG2 = .096,
ηP2 = .108. This is important because it addresses some alternative explanations for the
liberal/conservative differences in infrahumanization in this sample, such as the fact that liberal
participants had, on average, higher levels of political identification than conservative
participants.
In terms of the specific emotions that participants selected to characterize their ingroup
and outgroup, some notable patterns emerged. Frequencies and percentages are listed in Table 3,
which shows the complete list of 20 emotions, once for conservative participants’ ratings and
once for liberal participants.’ Both lists are sorted by the highest-frequency emotions attributed
to the outgroup. Secondary emotions are listed in bold font and positive emotions are designated
with asterisks. Note that the words “rage” and fear”—both negative primary emotions—were
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commonly used by both groups to describe their respective outgroup. However, conservative
participants also chose the words “love” and “friendliness”—both positive secondary emotions—
with a relatively high frequency to describe liberals, and conservatives generally used a greater
mix of primary and secondary emotions to describe liberals, whereas liberals’ highest-frequency
choices were almost exclusively primary negative emotions. Liberals chose the words “cruelty”
and “terror” to describe conservatives, whereas these words appear near the bottom of the list for
conservatives’ ratings of liberals.
Discussion
The major hypotheses in this experiment—that mindful attention would reduce or
eliminate linguistic intergroup bias and infrahumanization in a context emphasizing opposing
political group membership—were not supported. Moreover, the LIB effect could not be reliably
elicited in any condition, even in an active control condition characterized by repeated
instructions to completely immerse oneself in the stimuli. The infrahumanization results were
more nuanced, in that infrahumanization was observed across all conditions, but not exactly in
the manner predicted by prior theory; ingroup members did not attribute fewer secondary
emotions to outgroups irrespective of emotional valence. Instead, the effect was generally
associated with only positive secondary emotions, and this coexisted with another clear pattern:
positive emotions in general were differentially attributed more to the ingroup and negative
emotions were differentially attributed more to the outgroup, arguably a form of intergroup bias
it itself.
This raises the question of whether the pattern of results genuinely reflects the
phenomenon of “infrahumanization” or rather reflects a more generalized ingroup-favoritism or
bias effect. Indeed, this seems to be a point of some contention in the prior literature. For
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example, Leyens et al., in their 2007 review, state that the hypothesis that people will associate
both positive and negative uniquely-human emotions to the ingroup more than the outgroup is
precisely what distinguishes infrahumanization from something like ingroup-favoritism (p. 146).
However, several years earlier, Leyens et al. (2003) briefly discussed how the valence of the
stimuli often had unanticipated effects in their experiments, particularly in contexts associated
with intergroup conflict and antagonism. They observe that “[during later experiments with
antagonistic groups], whereas almost all the negative primary emotions were attributed to the
outgroup and barely none to the ingroup, the difference was less pronounced for negative
secondary emotions” (p. 709). While the authors do not specify exactly what this means, it seems
consistent with the idea that at least in some contexts, the negative valence of the stimuli might
be more salient than the fact that they denote uniquely-human emotions. Thus, even negative
secondary emotions might be differentially attributed more to the outgroup. These two
statements by Leyens and colleagues seem at odds, however, and I am unaware of any resolution
in the literature that adequately clarifies the theoretical relationships among primary/secondary
emotions, emotional valence, and infrahumanization of outgroups in specific contexts.
Notwithstanding this theoretical murkiness, it still seems apparent that participants were
responding to the intergroup context, and that there was at least some degree of psychological
realism and ingroup-defensiveness present in the experiment. This is supported by the fact that a
clear relationship could be seen between level of ingroup identification and what I shall continue
to call infrahumanization. This is further attested to by responses to the manipulation-check
items that assessed affect and interest in response to the political pictures and disparaging
paragraph.
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Given this, what are we to make of the null findings with respect to the LIB effect
broadly, and to the mindfulness manipulation in particular? There are many possible
explanations other than that the null hypothesis is true. Methodologically, this experiment had
many similarities to Tincher et al. (2016), but was also different in key respects. It has become
increasingly evident to social psychologists that even minor differences in method can lead to
different results, and it is possible that I inadvertently introduced a moderator or nuisance
variable into the design. On the other hand, even aspects of the design that I copied exactly from
Tincher et al. (2016), such as the experimental instructions and the sentences and drawings used
to measure potential LIB, could have weaknesses or unreliable effects. Several aspects of the
method seem especially relevant:
1. Whereas most LIB research, including Tincher et al. (2016), expose participants to the
LIB stimuli suddenly and without prior visual processing tasks, I asked participants to pay close
attention to other visual stimuli prior to LIB stimulus exposure, which may have encouraged all
participants to be more concrete in their visual judgments generally. For example, whereas
Tincher et al. (2016) observed mean language abstraction scores of 2.0 or above in three of their
experimental conditions, mean scores in this experiment never exceeded 2.0.
2. Unlike Tincher et al. (2016), I included within-subjects factors as part of the design,
which meant that participants’ ratings of their ingroup were compared to their own outgroup
ratings (c.f., Maass et al., 1996). This raises the possibility that the LIB effect may have been
present in the initial block of trials, but then disappeared in the participants’ second block, as
they got used to doing the task. Unfortunately, I failed to adequately record which block was
randomly presented first for each participant, so I was unable to test this hypothesis.
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3. The ingroup identification scale was always presented at the beginning of the
experiment and was always followed by politically-themed pictures and a derogatory political
paragraph. This could have potentially influenced participants’ behavior or offered some hints
about the intent of the study.
4. Most LIB research, including Tincher et al. (2016), presents the LIB response options
always in the same order, from the most concrete description first to the most abstract description
last. This introduces the risk of primacy/recency effects in participants’ responses (e.g., visualmode surveys have been associated with primacy effects, Groves et al., 2011, pp. 157, 239).
5. Even though there was at least some evidence of psychological realism, it is possible
that the stimuli were not realistic enough. For example, the LIB stimuli consisted of crudelydrawn cartoon pictures, which have the advantage of being ambiguous regarding demographic
characteristics but also have the disadvantage of not depicting actual human beings engaged in
actual behavior. In addition, the ingroup threat stimuli arguably did not present a convincing
cover story about who wrote the paragraphs and under what circumstances. These aspects of
artificiality could have reduced the salience and meaning of the intergroup context.
6. Finally, the attentional instructions used for the experimental manipulation consisted
of brief text and recorded narration that lasted just under two minutes. It is important to note that
these instructions, although repeated three times during the experiment, did not contain
interactive components, such as a guided meditation. Arguably, presenting intellectually-focused
instructions about what constitutes an “observing perspective” is a rather low-dose mindfulness
manipulation. This argument is supported by the relatively moderate responses that were
provided to the Toronto Mindfulness Scale items immediately after viewing the stimuli. A
stronger mindfulness manipulation might have led the participant through an interactive
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mindfulness exercise, during which they could experience their present-moment thoughts,
feelings, and perceptions and notice their transient quality.
Experiment 2
Given the six potential design weaknesses identified above, I sought to carry out another
experiment that followed the same overall paradigm but included several design modifications.
Thus, Experiment 2 had the same goals in mind as Experiment 1 and had an identical factorial
design (i.e., same independent and dependent variables, factorial structure, and basic procedure).
However, several aspects of the design were modified (described in the next section).
Method
Sample and participant selection. Two hundred and sixty-five students, recruited from
an undergraduate participant pool at a large public northeastern university in the United States,
participated in the study in exchange for partial course credit. Recruitment procedures were
identical to Experiment 1, with the exception that a slightly wider range of political nonaffiliation was excluded from eligibility. 4 Recruitment and data collection took place during the
month of October, 2017.
No participants were excluded from data analysis, so the final sample consisted of 265
participants (68.3% female; Mage = 18.4 years, SDage = 1.2 years, age range: 17-25 years). Of the
265 participants, 92 (34.7%) self-identified as conservative and 173 (65.3.0%) self-identified as
liberal. Random assignment to experimental conditions yielded the following slightly
imbalanced design: n = 88 in the no instruction condition; n = 89 in the immersion condition; and
n = 88 in the mindfulness condition.
Twenty-five participants (9.4%) failed at least one attention check that had been included
in the experiment. As in Experiment 1, all analyses were conducted by both including and

MINDFULNESS AND POLITICAL INTERGROUP BIAS

44

excluding these 25 participants, and none of the results substantively changed when they were
included or excluded. Therefore, these participants were left in the sample for all data analyses.
Procedure and measures. All aspects of the procedure and the measures were identical
to Experiment 1 except for seven design modifications, which are reviewed below. Cronbach’s
alphas for the SDO, ingroup identification, and FFMQ scales were .76, .91, and .80, respectively.
1. The modality and topical content of attentional practice stimuli was changed from
visual to auditory and from political in nature to apolitical. Instead of the political/social pictures
in Experiment 1, I used a two-minute, fifteen-second audio excerpt from episode 476, Act Two,
of the public radio program “This American Life.” The excerpt consisted of a narrative, firstperson account of a shark attack. This design change was implemented both to preclude the
possibility of visually affecting the implicit cognitive processes usually evoked when LIB visual
stimuli are suddenly presented, as well as to provide an emotionally evocative stimulus that
would help mask the political theme of the experiment.
2. The cartoon LIB stimulus pictures were replaced with real-world counterparts taken
from the internet. In addition, two of the stimulus behaviors that were associated with
excessively-skewed responses in Experiment 1 (e.g., a person running, which was almost
exclusively answered using the most concrete description across all conditions) were replaced
with other behaviors that were of the same valence. That is, the behavior of telling a sexist joke
was replaced with cheating on a test, and the behavior of running was replaced with someone
studying. The pictures and their response options appear in Appendix D.
3. The LIB stimulus response options were randomized for every picture.
4. Variables were added to allow the recording of which LIB trial block (ingroup vs.
outgroup) was randomly presented first to each participant.
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5. A more realistic context for the ingroup-threatening message was developed. While the
text of the actual paragraph stayed the same, participants were informed that “the statement was
recently recorded during a private, closed-door fundraiser for a [liberal/conservative, depending
on their outgroup] congressional caucus. The comments were part of a caucus member’s speech
to potential donors.”
6. The ingroup identification scale was randomly presented either at the beginning or end
of the experiment. This helped balance the need to make political belonging salient, but at the
same time, to minimize the potential for providing cues about the intent of the experiment.
7. For the mindfulness condition only, I added an auditory-guided meditation exercise in
addition to attentional instructions. The guided meditation was presented immediately after the
shark-attack audio clip, and it consisted of a short (approximately one minute) audio recording of
the experimenter, who read matching on-screen text. The meditation asked the participant to
close their eyes and observe any thoughts or other reactions they had to listening to the audio
clip. It also asked them to scan their body and notice sensations, notice sounds, feelings, and so
forth, and to also notice how those experiences arise and fade away and are constantly changing.
All attention instructions, including those used for the auditory guided meditation, are included
verbatim in Appendix E.
Results
Descriptives and distributional assumptions. The distributions for language abstraction and
emotion-count scores were very similar to those in Experiment 1. Both measures were clustered
toward the low end and had some positive skew and peaked distributions (M = 1.87, Mdn = 1.5,
SD = 0.66 for language abstraction; M = 5.2, Mdn = 5.0, SD = 2.1 for emotion frequency).
Assumptions for homogeneity of variance were assessed in the same manner as in Experiment 1
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and no substantial differences among groups were detected. As in Experiment 1, ingroup
identification had an overall negative significant correlation with SDO, r = -.19, p = 002, but
interacted with political ideology in that conservatives showed a positive correlation (b = 0.144,
p = .094) whereas liberals showed a negative one (b = -0.415, p < .001). Trait mindfulness was
not significantly correlated with either ingroup identification or SDO. Table 4 lists the means,
standard deviations, and other descriptive information about the covariate measures. The
percentage of participants who reported having some prior meditation was similar to that
observed in Experiment 1. Reported meditation experience did not significantly differ between
liberal and conservative participants (35.9% vs. 36.4%, respectively), χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 1.0.
Additionally, reported prior meditation experience was associated with significantly higher trait
mindfulness scores, with means of 3.33 (SD = 0.41) for those with prior meditation experience
and 3.21 (SD = 0.39) for those with no prior meditation experience, t(1, 263) = 2.41, p = .017.
(Note that these means are almost identical to those observed in Experiment 1, but the larger
sample size in Experiment 2 resulted in a higher power to detect a statistically reliable
difference.)
I used the same two comparisons as in Experiment 1 to examine differences in degree of
political ingroup identification between liberal and conservative participants. For example, for
the single-item question of political identification, conservative participants had an average score
that was 1.15 points away from the mid-point of the scale (in the conservative direction),
whereas liberal participants were 1.38 points away from the mid-point of the scale (in the liberal
direction). In other words, although the difference was smaller than it was in Experiment 1,
liberal participants in Experiment 2 reported being more highly liberal on average than
conservatives reported being highly conservative, t(1, 263) = -3.25, p = .001. In addition, liberal
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participants had a higher average overall political ingroup identification than conservatives, with
mean scores of 4.86 and 4.47, respectively, t(1, 263) = -3.51, p < .001.
Manipulation checks. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the 12 manipulationcheck items, which were identical to Experiment 1 in wording and placement, except that the
word “pictures” was changed to “audio clip” in items 5 and 6. As in Experiment 1, means were
in the expected direction. For example, participants indicated that they had, on average,
moderate-to-high levels of affect and interest in response to the audio clip and disparaging
paragraph (items 6 and 11), and they reported relatively high levels of being able to continuously
follow the attentional instructions and that it was relatively easy to do so (items 7 and 8).
Although the means and distributions for the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (items 1 through
4 in Table 5) still suggested relatively modest levels of curiosity and decentering regarding the
stimuli, it is notable that means, medians, and ranges were higher relative to Experiment 1. This
suggests that the mindfulness manipulation was indeed stronger than in Experiment 1, but still
not ideal. For example, the median score of 3 represents a response of moderately, and standard
deviations close to 1.0 indicate that a relatively common response to these items was a score of 2
(a little). This was especially true regarding the statement that their thoughts were not an
“accurate reflection of the way things ‘really’ are,” which suggests that like in Experiment 1,
many participants were identified with their beliefs about the outgroup; that is, they found the
stereotyped messages coming from the outgroup member as plausible and reflective of reality.
Linguistic Intergroup Bias. I conducted a 2 (stimulus target’s group membership:
ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (stimulus target’s behavior valence: positive vs. negative) × 3
(attentional instructions: no instructions, immersion, or mindfulness) mixed factorial ANOVA;
the first two variables were within-subjects. As in Experiment 1, the omnibus interaction effect
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was non-significant, F(2, 262) = 1.06, p = .348, ηG2 = .001, ηP2 = .008. Figure 4 depicts the
estimated means for this interaction (error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals). The two-way
interaction between the target group membership and behavior valence was also non-significant,
F(1, 262) = 2.43, p = .120, ηG2 = .002, ηP2 = .009, again suggesting that the LIB effect did not
occur, even in the two control conditions. Subsequent contrast analyses confirmed this, though
the pattern of means in the mindfulness condition was consistent with the LIB effect for both
ingroup and outgroup (but none of those mean differences were statistically significant).
There was a significant main effect of experimental condition, F(1, 262) = 3.69, p = .026,
ηG2 = .014, ηP2 = .027. Tukey post-hoc contrasts showed that the significant difference was
driven by the mean language abstraction score between the immersion and mindfulness
condition, whereby independent of stimulus valence and target group, participants tended to give
more abstract ratings in the mindfulness condition (M = 1.9, 95% CI [1.88, 2.08]) than in the
immersion condition (M = 1.7, 95% CI [1.70, 1.90]), t(262) = -2.54, p = .031). While not
necessarily theoretically meaningful, it is a surprising result considering that, if anything, one
might have predicted more concrete scores in the mindfulness condition.
Additionally, I conducted a separate repeated measures ANOVA with a single withinsubjects factor, stimulus block, to test whether responses differed between the first and second
block of trials. The effect of stimulus block was not significant, F(1, 262) = 1.19, p = .276, nor
did it interact with experimental condition. Thus, I could find no support for the hypothesis that
the LIB effect was elicited during the first block of trials but dissipated during the second block.
Other potential moderators, such as participant ingroup, prior meditation experience, trait
mindfulness, SDO, and ingroup identification score did not reveal further theoretically
meaningful or statistically significant effects for linguistic abstraction scores.
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Infrahumanization. In general, the results for the Experiment 2 infrahumanization
stimuli had an almost identical pattern and range of effect sizes as in Experiment 1. I initially
conducted a 2 (target’s group membership: ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (emotion type: primary vs.
secondary) × 2 (emotion valence: positive vs. negative) × 3 (attentional instructions: no
instructions, immersion, or mindfulness) factorial ANOVA with repeated-measures on the first
three variables. The main hypothesis of interest consisted of the three-way interaction among
target group, emotion type, and attentional instructions (shown in Figure 5). However, none of
the three-way interactions nor the four-way interaction were reliable, ps > .264. The two-way
interaction between target group and emotion type was significant, F(1, 262) = 50.82, p < .001,
ηG2 = .016, ηP2 = .162, with a similar pattern of means as in Experiment 1. Participants
consistently rated the outgroup as having fewer secondary emotions than the ingroup (means of
3.05 vs. 2.16, respectively), whereas they rated the outgroup as having more primary emotions
than the ingroup (means of 2.82 vs. 2.36, respectively). Simple effects tests showed that the
effect of target group was significant within only secondary emotions, F(1, 262) = 54.81, p <
.001, ηG2 = .046, ηP2 = .173, as well as within only primary emotions, F(1, 262) = 15.53, p <
.001, ηG2 = .012, ηP2 = .056. This 2-way interaction and results of simple effects tests is the same
as found in Experiment 1. The main effect of target group was also significant, F(1, 262) = 9.27,
p = .003, ηG2 = .005, ηP2 = .034. On average, and replicating Experiment 1’s result, participants
attributed a greater number of emotions to the ingroup than the outgroup (means of 5.41 vs. 4.98,
respectively).
There were three significant effects associated with the valence of the emotions. The
main effect of valence was significant, F(1, 262) = 60.48, p < .001, ηG2 = .025, ηP2 = .188.
Across other factors, participants tended to select more positive than negative emotions.
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However, two interactions qualified this effect. First, there was significant two-way interaction
between emotion valence and target group, F(1, 262) = 147.9, p < .001, ηG2 = .093, ηP2 = .361.
That is, participants attributed more positive emotions to their ingroup (M = 3.98 for ingroup and
2.07 for outgroup) and more negative emotions to the outgroup (M = 1.43 for ingroup and 2.91
for outgroup), independent of whether those emotions were primary or secondary in nature.
Second, there was a significant two-way interaction between emotion valence and emotion type,
F(1, 262) = 147.9, p < .001, ηG2 = .093, ηP2 = .361. Independent of target group, participants
tended to select more negative primary emotions (M = 2.31) then negative secondary emotions
(M = 2.03), and they tended to select fewer positive primary emotions (M = 2.87) than positive
secondary emotions (M = 3.18). No other main effects or interactions were reliable, ps > .264.
This pattern of results also replicated those observed in Experiment 1.
When the participant’s political ingroup was added to the model, there were still no
effects associated with the experimental manipulation. However, as in Experiment 1, the
participant’s ingroup was found to moderate the infrahumanization effect. That is, the three-way
interaction between the participant’s political ingroup, the target group, and the type of emotion
was significant, though the effect size of this interaction was somewhat smaller than in
Experiment 1, F(1, 259) = 28.38, p < .001, ηG2 = .008, ηP2 = .099. Inspection of the means for
each group revealed that although conservative participants had very little differences in the
average number of emotions they selected across the target group and emotion type, liberal
participants’ distribution of emotions showed a reliable pattern of attributing more primary
emotions and fewer secondary to the outgroup (conservatives) relative to the ingroup (liberals).
This interaction was further qualified by a four-way interaction among the participant’s
political ingroup, emotion valence, emotion type, and target group, though again the effect size
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of this interaction was smaller than in Experiment 1, just bordering the significance threshold,
F(1, 259) = 3.90, p = .0494, ηG2 = .0008, ηP2 = .015. The smaller interaction effect relative to
Experiment 1 was due to a stronger tendency for conservative participants to infrahumanize
liberals using positive emotions in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, though liberal
participants still exhibited this effect in a much more pronounced way (see Figure 6).
To decompose the four-way interaction, a simple effects tests were performed to examine
how the two-way interaction between target group and emotion type varied as a function of
emotion valence and the participant’s ingroup. For conservative participants, the two-way
interaction between target group and emotion type was not significant for either positive
emotions, F(1, 91) < 1, p = .46, ηG2 = .0006, ηP2 = .006, or for negative emotions, F(1, 55) < 1, p
= .35, ηG2 = .001, ηP2 = .010. However, for liberal participants only, the two-way interaction
between target group and emotion type was significant for both positive emotions, F(1, 172) =
57.2, p < .001, ηG2 = .044, ηP2 = .249 and for negative emotions, F(1, 172) = 39.0, p < .001, ηG2 =
.028, ηP2 = .185. Additional simple effects tests revealed that for liberal participants, the
difference in how much they attributed primary and secondary emotions to the ingroup versus
outgroup was significant in all cases except for negative secondary emotions (the latter not
reaching significance after alpha correction for multiple tests). For example, for positive
secondary emotions, liberals attributed significantly fewer emotions to the outgroup (M = 0.76)
than the ingroup (M = 2.45), F(1, 172) = 193.7, p < .001, ηG2 = .031, ηP2 = .530 (this effect size
was like that observed in Experiment 1 and was roughly five times larger than among
conservative participants in Experiment 2, who had an effect size of ηP2 = .099 for the same
comparison). Additionally, liberal participants attributed fewer positive primary emotions to
conservatives, though the effect size was small, F(1, 172) = 17.6, p < .001, ηG2 = .031, ηP2 =
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.093, and they attributed more negative primary emotions to conservatives F(1, 172) = 103.0, p <
.001, ηG2 = .167, ηP2 = .375.
The relationship between ingroup identification and infrahumanization that was observed
in Experiment 1 was replicated in Experiment 2, F(1, 258) = 23.61, p < .001, ηG2 = .085, ηP2 = .
085, b = 0.588. In other words, after controlling for the main effects and interactions among
experimental condition and the participant’s ingroup, the main effect of ingroup identification
explained 8.5% of the variance in the infrahumanization effect. This effect was not moderated by
the participant’s political ingroup (i.e., the relationship was positive for both liberal and
conservative participants) nor by whether the participant completed the ingroup identification
scale at the beginning of the experiment versus at the end. Also, like in Experiment 1, the effect
of the participant’s political ingroup on infrahumanization was still significant after controlling
for each of the different covariates (i.e., meditation experience, trait mindfulness, SDO, and
ingroup identification).
In terms of the specific emotions that participants selected to characterize their ingroup
and outgroup, patterns were like those observed in Experiment 1. Frequencies and percentages
are listed in Table 6. Again, the words “rage” and fear” were commonly used by both groups to
describe their respective outgroup. However, conservative participants also chose the words
“love” and “friendliness” with a higher frequency to describe liberals than vice-versa. Liberals
chose the words “cruelty” and “terror” to describe conservatives, whereas these words appear
near the bottom of the list for conservatives’ ratings of liberals.
Discussion
Despite the design improvements relative to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 resulted in an
almost identical pattern of data. Moreover, the differences that did occur relative to Experiment 1
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do not have clear theoretical implications. Given that the combined data from both experiments
are comprised of a considerable number of participants, the pattern of results in terms of what
replicated and what did not is striking; the LIB effect could not be reliably elicited, but both
liberal and conservative participants displayed bias in terms of how they viewed the emotions of
typical outgroup members. The mindfulness manipulation had no effect on this phenomenon and,
if anything, it led to a pattern of more abstract linguistic scores that had means characteristic of
the LIB effect in Experiment 2.
The pattern of data from manipulation checks was also similar to Experiment 1. While
most participants reported having strong emotions in response to the stimuli and being able to
follow the attention instructions, participants in the mindfulness condition did not necessarily
show strong agreement with questions that asked them if they were curious about their
experiences or took an open and decentered orientation to them (i.e., there was substantial
variation in response to those items). Thus, the addition of the guided meditation slightly
increased reported mindfulness relative to Experiment 1, but the difference was not substantial,
at least according to the selected items from the Toronto Mindfulness Scale.
It is also interesting to note the lack of differences observed between the no-instruction
and immersion control conditions, which was also true in Experiment 1. Since no clear pattern of
means were observed between these two conditions, it leaves open the question of whether
immersed attention represents what participants normally do (and so is no different from when
explicit instructions are not provided) or whether the immersion instructions were simply not
effective in these experiments. There is at least some evidence, however, that participants in the
immersion condition did in fact have a more immersive experience with the stimuli. When asked
whether they could “imagine the author of the paragraph speaking to me,” the mean level of

MINDFULNESS AND POLITICAL INTERGROUP BIAS

54

agreement on a 7-point Likert-type scale was 4.38 for participants in the no-instruction condition
and 5.20 in the immersion condition, a significant difference, t(169.4) = -3.68, p < .001.
Interestingly, the mean response in the mindfulness condition was also 5.20, suggesting that
those participants were also immersed in the stimuli to a similar degree.
General Discussion
Donald Campbell once wrote that, “the absence of the norms and practices of
replication…makes it theoretically predictable that the social disciplines will make little progress
(Campbell, 1986, p. 122). While increasing numbers of social psychologists are beginning to
agree with that insight, a significant obstacle to making replication more normative is the
ambiguity that results from a failed replication attempt. If an attempted replication fails to
produce the same results as the original research, how can we know what, exactly, failed?
Indeed, this is not just a problem for replications, but for null results more broadly. Paul Meehl
has summarized the dilemma that null results in the context of weakly-specified theory-testing
and reliance on directional significance tests can have for social science practice:
It is not unusual that…ad hoc challenging of auxiliary hypotheses is repeated in the
course of a series of related experiments, in which the auxiliary hypothesis involved in
Experiment 1…becomes the focus of interest in Experiment 2, which in turn utilizes
further plausible but easily challenged auxiliary hypotheses, and so forth. In this fashion a
zealous and clever investigator can slowly wend his way through a tenuous nomological
network, performing a long series of related experiments which appear to the uncritical
reader as a fine example of “an integrated research program,” without ever once refuting
or corroborating so much as a single strand of the network (Meehl, 1967, p. 114, italics
in original).
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The challenge, then, in the present two experiments—and in all failed replication
attempts—is how to know where in the chain of causal and auxiliary hypotheses did the failure
occur (Earp & Trafimow, 2015). In other words, were the substantive hypotheses refuted, or
could the null results be blamed on something else? Was one (or more) of my methodological
changes from the Tincher et al. (2016) experiment responsible for the lack of replication? Was it,
for example, that political ideology was simply not salient or important enough of an intergroup
context for college undergraduates to elicit the LIB effect? Was there something about the
stimuli or procedure that compromised internal or construct validity? Was the construct of
“mindfulness,” for example, not sufficiently operationalized and manipulated? Is it even possible
to do so in a brief laboratory experiment, or are researchers being too optimistic by thinking that
they can provide a five- or ten-minute set of attentional instructions and produce a different state
of mind in the participant, one that often takes years of dedicated practice to achieve in the real
world? Are instruments that are alleged to measure implicit intergroup phenomena such as the
LIB and infrahumanization themselves fraught with inconsistent effects and potential file
drawers of unpublished null findings? Unfortunately, these two experiments offer little insight
into these questions, leaving room to either craft new experiments that focus on these auxiliary
hypotheses directly, or simply leave the questions open and move on to something else. In either
case, the lower likelihood of being able to publish null findings in peer-reviewed journals
contributes to a skewed and potentially inaccurate scientific record because it leaves open the
question of whether prior positive published findings are reliable or are simply the result of
capitalization on chance and changing norms of what constitutes questionable research
practices. 5 Indeed, this is the crux of the current replication crisis in social psychology.
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Apart from the substantive hypotheses, however, the experiments here suggested two
compelling and replicable aspects of political bias. First, this research adds further support to the
claim that bias exists on both sides of the political spectrum and can be characterized by a failure
to distinguish between who the people on the other side are (i.e., what emotions they have as
human beings) and what they believe (i.e., the fact that they have particular political beliefs or
behaviors). This is the essence of psychological essentialism, the belief that others are
constitutionally different kinds of human beings. Indeed, perhaps they aren’t even quite as
“human” as we are. During a time of particularly pronounced political polarization in the United
States and elsewhere, it is disturbing to note how easy it can be to assume that one’s political
adversaries inherently feel more rage, fear, cruelty, terror, and shame than we do. Whether held
consciously or unconsciously, those assumptions may very well influence how messages are sent
and received, or how behavior is interpreted, between group members, and may have selffulfilling and self-perpetuating consequences.
But the experiments revealed another perhaps more surprising result: that liberal
participants were more biased against conservatives than vice versa, even when controlling for
within-group degree of political identification. This finding contradicts a substantial empirical
record which suggests that liberals are the more tolerant and cognitively flexible of the two
political variants, at least in the United States (for a thorough review, see Jost, 2017). However,
there are reasons to think that the past empirical record on this issue could itself be biased, or at
least limited. Recent scholarship suggests that ideological context matters when assessing
phenomena such as political intolerance and prejudice, and that both liberals and conservatives
can show very similar propensities for bias and intolerance when confronted with “ideologically
objectionable” circumstances (Crawford, 2009; Crawford et al., 2013; Crawford & Pilanski,
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2014). These scholars point out, for example, that motivated reasoning, feelings of righteousness,
and perceptual inaccuracy are not limited to any political group (Haidt, 2012). For example,
Graham, Nosek, and Haidt (2012) found that not only did both liberals and conservatives tend to
exaggerate their actual intergroup differences of moral concerns, but that liberals were the least
accurate about both groups.
Further, the motivational and cognitive antecedents of left-right political orientation can
be context-specific, so what is “ideologically objectionable” in one place, time, or context may
not be in another (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). For example, this research was
undertaken during a time of conservative and “alt-right” ascendency in the United States, with an
unlikely and highly-unpopular president having just been elected and a Republican majority in
both houses of Congress. It is plausible that in this context, conservative participants’ needs were
being met such that intergroup bias was not manifest in their behavior, whereas the exact
opposite was true for liberal participants.
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that political ideology is both explicitly and
implicitly connected to public policy and the law. In other words, liberals and conservatives are
associated with distinct types of policy positions, and those positions can be shown to have
objective, “real-world” effects in the everyday lives of groups of people. Sometimes those effects
are harmful. Consequently, another way to understand the intergroup bias in these experiments,
especially on the part of liberal participants, is to question whether it represents “bias” at all, but
rather convictions about the effects of ideology, or even observations of liberal and conservative
politicians’ emotional expressions. Perhaps mindfulness did not affect differential attribution of
emotions because even when liberals become more mindful of their thoughts and feelings, they
remain convinced that conservatives act from feelings of fear, terror, and cruelty. One might ask,
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then, when it comes to political conviction, what exactly would we expect a “decentered”
perspective to result in? Does lack of “bias” imply an acceptance of behavior or harmful social
policy? Or is it rather that mindfulness should allow one to have a less biased perception of who
an outgroup member is as a person, while still being able to maintain an opposition to harmful
behaviors and policies?
A further objection to the “liberal bias” interpretation of these findings relates to the
measure of infrahumanization that was used in these experiments. That is, one could argue that
the emotion/trait words used to measure the infrahumanization effect in these experiments were
confounded with common political stereotypes that liberals and conservatives have of each other.
It is plausible, for example, that while conservative participants were able to select words like
“love” and “friendliness” to describe liberals—aligning with the “bleeding heart” liberal
stereotype—liberals did not have similar stereotype-consistent positive, secondary emotion
words to apply to conservatives. Thus, what appeared to be asymmetrical infrahumanization may
have simply been a function of the words each group had available to choose from. Moreover,
the classification of “primary” and “secondary” emotions for the words used in these
experiments is based on relatively sparse normative data collected from non-U.S. samples
(Paladino et al., 2002). While the general lay distinction between primary and secondary
emotions seems to be a cross-culturally robust finding, semantic differences among languages
can create translation issues for specific emotion words and this, in turn, can create a challenge to
construct validity (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2001; Leyens et al., 2003; Leyens et al.,
2007; Paladino et al., 2002). Thus, for example, using a word such as “cruelty” to signify an
emotion may have been a suboptimal aspect of the measure, since such words are arguably more
like trait attributions than emotional ones.

MINDFULNESS AND POLITICAL INTERGROUP BIAS

59

Limitations, Future Directions, and Concluding Remarks
As suggested above, the two experiments in this research were not without their own
limitations. For example, given that participants’ political ingroup was found to moderate the
infrahumanization effect, it would have been better to have a balanced design with equal
numbers of conservative and liberal participants. This would have made for cleaner analyses and
more precise parameter estimates, especially for the conservative group. But more broadly, the
design would have benefited from the ability for participants to choose from among a set of
groups or issues which one they cared the most about (e.g., pro-life vs. pro-choice, ethnicity,
religion, etc.). The experiment could then have been individually tailored to each participant’s
most meaningful intergroup context.
It would be also useful to further explore emotional perceptions of political outgroups,
testing to see whether the asymmetrical bias in infrahumanization that was observed in these
experiments is a robust and reproducible finding. A further extension would be to compare
political ingroup members’ perceptions of outgroup emotions to actual outgroup self-reports.
There is some evidence to suggest, for example, that political partisans exhibit different
emotional profiles when considering themselves as members of their political group (Seger,
Smith, Kinias, & Mackie, 2009; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Might some degree of political
intergroup hostility be accounted for by mutual discomfort with the outgroup’s typical emotional
expression? In such investigations, care should be taken to avoid potential measurement
confounds by including a wider range of emotions and traits (i.e., to allow the disentangling of
stereotype content from other processes such as infrahumanization).
A further aspect of the design that was suboptimal was the measurement of trait
mindfulness at the end of the experiment rather than at some prior time, such as during the
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prescreening survey. Including the measurement at the end of the experiment left open the
possibility that the experiment itself may have biased the measurement.
Finally, it would be helpful to extend this paradigm to other populations besides college
undergraduates, and to explore other means of inducing mindfulness, such as longer or repeated
sessions, using recordings from actual meditation teachers, or creating more interactive
exercises, such as allowing participants to write down their thoughts and then reflect on them.
One of the biggest challenges of this research was knowing whether mindfulness was
successfully induced and, if so, to what degree and duration. It is difficult to conceive of a nonreactive measure for assessing state-mindfulness since calling attention to one’s experiences can
itself influence the person’s attention (this is why the Toronto Mindfulness Scale was not used in
the two control conditions). Even if we can assume that mindfulness was induced, how this
manifested in terms of differences in cognitive processing is far from clear. Thus, another helpful
extension would be to include more neuro-psychological measures along with self-report.
If the essence of mindful attention is indeed “observing without evaluating,” as
Krishnamurti suggested, then one thing seems clear: it is a rare skill indeed. The promise of
interpersonal and intergroup mindfulness is that it allows one to make clearer distinctions
between the basic humanity of the other versus their behaviors and beliefs. But it remains to be
seen whether, and to what extent, this skill might be transformative for intergroup relations.
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Footnotes
1

See Sedlmeier et al. (2012) and Gotink et al. (2015) for meta-analyses that include a

combined 278 relevant experimental studies, but compare to another recent meta-analysis
including 47 studies that showed more mixed results (Goyal et al., 2014). It is worth noting that
one of the main conclusions of such meta-analyses is that, while mindfulness-based interventions
seem efficacious overall, the majority of empirical work has methodological weaknesses and
high variability in operational definitions and measures, which make causal inference or crossstudy comparison difficult. Indeed, meta-analyses to date have had to exclude the majority of
existing research.
2

Berry & Brown’s (2017) chapter also reviews studies that used other forms of

meditation, such as loving-kindness meditation. While these meditative practices share much in
common with mindfulness meditation—they almost certainly involve some cultivation of
mindfulness—they are also distinct enough from basic mindfulness in their aims and form that
they are not considered here.
3

I subsequently ran a model that also included the participant’s ingroup (liberal or

conservative) and the LIB stimulus set version that the participant viewed (set A or B), but
neither of these factors contributed to variance in the dependent measure and were therefore
excluded from further analyses.
4

In Experiment 2, a continuous measure of political identification was used as an

eligibility filter. The question had the same wording as in Experiment 1, but this time the
response scale was a continuous slider that yielded values from 1.00 (extremely liberal) to 7.00
(extremely conservative). Participants who scored below 3.00 or above 4.50 were eligible for the
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study (a larger criterion window was used for the conservative end of the scale due to the limited
number of conservatives in the student population). While this was not an ideal design choice,
statistical controls were used in data analysis to ensure that any sampling bias introduced by this
procedure would not bias statistical inference.
5

To be fair, there are many indications that this is changing, though the change is slow

and not evenly distributed among subfields and journals. The American Psychological
Association, for example, now has standardized protocols for preregistering replication attempts
with peer-reviewed designs, and the results are published regardless of outcome.
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Table 1
Experiment 1: Descriptive statistics for covariate measures
n

Yes

Prior meditation experience

206

f
73

Length of meditation experience (years)
Composite trait mindfulness score
Composite ingroup identification score
Composite SDO score

n
73
207
207
203

M
3.16
3.26
4.68
2.12

No
%
35.3

f
133

%
64.3

SD
1.87
0.37
0.82
0.99

Mdn
3.00
3.25
4.71
2.00

Min
1
2.04
2.43
1.00

Max
6
4.21
6.64
5.00
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Table 2
Experiment 1: Descriptive statistics for manipulation check items
Item #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Item text
I was curious about my reactions to things.
I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was having.
I was more concerned with being open to my experiences than controlling or
changing them.
I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily
accurate reflection of the way things ‘really’ are.
To what extent were you able to continuously pay attention to the pictures?
To what extent did you have strong feelings while looking at the pictures?
To what extent do you feel like you were able to continuously follow the
instructions that were provided?
How easy or difficult was it to follow the instructions?
I understood what the paragraph was about.
I found the paragraph kind of boring.
I felt strong feelings as I read the paragraph.
I could imagine the author of the paragraph speaking to me.

n
69
69
69

M
2.80
2.90
2.88

SD
0.95
0.97
0.87

Mdn
3.00
3.00
2.50

Min
1
1
1

Max
4.5
5
5

69

2.63

0.90

2.50

1

5

70
68
137

4.19
3.57
3.89

0.91
1.01
0.87

4.00
4.00
4.00

1
1
1

5
5
5

137
207
206
207
207

3.83
6.05
2.95
5.49
4.98

1.03
0.99
1.39
1.31
1.53

4.00
6.00
2.00
6.00
5.00

1.5
1
1
1
1

5
7
7
7
7

Note. Items 1-4 were taken from the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Lau et al., 2006) and were only asked of those in the mindfulness
condition; response options ranged from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Items 5 and 6 were asked of participants in the control (no
attentional instruction) condition, and response options ranged from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Items 7 and 8 were asked of
participants in the immersed-attention and mindfulness condition; response options for item 7 ranged from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very
much), and response options for item 8 ranged from 1 (very difficult) to 5 (very easy). Items 9-12 were asked of all participants, and
response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Note that items 1-4 and items 7-8 were asked at two
different times: after participants viewed the political/social photographs, and after they read the disparaging political paragraph. The
descriptive statistics presented above for those items represent the average score from those two responses.
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Table 3
Experiment 1: Frequencies of emotions selected to describe participants’ ingroup and outgroup
Conservatives
Emotion

*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*

Rage
Love
Fear
Friendliness
Desire
Disappointment
Pleasure
Shame
Pain
Despair
Attraction
Guilt
Enjoyment
Terror
Fondness
Amazement
Surprise
Remorse
Serenity
Cruelty

Type
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Primary

Outgroup
f
%
33
8.6%
32
8.3%
32
8.3%
32
8.3%
30
7.8%
26
6.8%
23
6.0%
18
4.7%
16
4.2%
16
4.2%
15
3.9%
15
3.9%
14
3.6%
14
3.6%
14
3.6%
13
3.4%
12
3.1%
12
3.1%
9
2.3%
8
2.1%

Ingroup
f
%
15
3.9%
34
8.9%
21
5.5%
36
9.4%
36
9.4%
15
3.9%
27
7.1%
12
3.1%
13
3.4%
8
2.1%
18
4.7%
12
3.1%
32
8.4%
6
1.6%
26
6.8%
24
6.3%
14
3.7%
13
3.4%
8
2.1%
11
2.9%

Liberals
Emotion

*

*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*

Rage
Fear
Desire
Cruelty
Disappointment
Terror
Enjoyment
Pleasure
Shame
Friendliness
Despair
Love
Pain
Remorse
Surprise
Fondness
Amazement
Attraction
Guilt
Serenity

Primary
Primary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary

Outgroup
f
%
94
11.5%
79
9.6%
65
7.9%
62
7.6%
60
7.3%
53
6.5%
43
5.2%
42
5.1%
40
4.9%
39
4.8%
34
4.1%
32
3.9%
30
3.7%
29
3.5%
25
3.0%
21
2.6%
21
2.6%
20
2.4%
19
2.3%
12
1.5%

Ingroup
f
%
31
3.2%
55
5.7%
60
6.2%
12
1.2%
39
4.0%
17
1.8%
70
7.2%
59
6.1%
19
2.0%
122
12.6%
30
3.1%
117
12.1%
33
3.4%
38
3.9%
30
3.1%
68
7.0%
41
4.2%
34
3.5%
32
3.3%
59
6.1%

Note. The left-most set of columns represent conservative participants’ responses, and the right-most set of columns represent liberal
participants’ responses. Both sets of responses are sorted by the highest-frequency emotions attributed to the outgroup. Secondary
emotions are listed in bold font and positive emotions are designated with asterisks.
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Table 4
Experiment 2: Descriptive statistics for covariate measures
n

Yes

Prior meditation experience

265

f
96

Length of meditation experience (years)
Composite trait mindfulness score
Composite ingroup identification score
Composite SDO score

n
95
265
265
261

M
2.74
3.25
4.73
2.12

No
%
36.2

f
169

%
63.8

SD
1.77
0.40
0.88
0.98

Mdn
3.00
3.25
4.71
2.00

Min
1.00
2.13
2.43
1.00

Max
6.00
4.46
7.00
6.00
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Table 5
Experiment 2: Descriptive statistics for manipulation check items
Item #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Question text
I was curious about my reactions to things.
I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was having.
I was more concerned with being open to my experiences than controlling or
changing them.
I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily
accurate reflection of the way things ‘really’ are.
To what extent were you able to continuously pay attention to the audio clip?
To what extent did you have strong feelings while listening to the audio clip?
To what extent do you feel like you were able to continuously follow the
instructions that were provided?
How easy or difficult was it to follow the instructions?
I understood what the paragraph was about.
I found the paragraph kind of boring.
I felt strong feelings as I read the paragraph.
I could imagine the author of the paragraph speaking to me.

n
88
88
88

M
3.10
3.00
3.18

SD
0.95
0.90
0.90

Mdn
3.00
3.00
3.00

Min
1
1
1

Max
5
5
5

88

2.99

0.75

3.00

1

4.5

88
88
177

4.35
3.09
4.28

0.66
1.02
0.68

4.00
3.00
4.50

3
1
2

5
5
5

177
265
265
265
264

4.36
6.13
2.99
5.60
4.93

0.82
1.07
1.43
1.41
1.56

4.50
6.00
3.00
6.00
5.00

1.5
1
1
1
1

5
7
7
7
7

Note. Items 1-4 were taken from the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Lau et al., 2006) and were only asked of those in the mindfulness
condition; response options ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Items 5 and 6 were asked of participants in the control (no
attentional instruction) condition, and response options ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Items 7 and 8 were asked of
participants in the immersed-attention and mindfulness condition; response options for item 7 ranged from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very
much), and response options for item 8 ranged from 1 (very difficult) to 5 (very easy). Items 9-12 were asked of all participants, and
response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Note that items 1-4 and items 7-8 were asked at two
different times: after participants viewed the political/social photographs, and after they read the disparaging political paragraph. The
descriptive statistics presented above for those items represent the average score from those two responses.
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Table 6
Experiment 2: Frequencies of emotions selected to describe participants’ ingroup and outgroup
Conservatives
Emotion

*
*
*

*

*
*
*
*
*
*

Fear
Rage
Desire
Disappointment
Friendliness
Love
Shame
Remorse
Enjoyment
Despair
Pain
Terror
Guilt
Fondness
Cruelty
Pleasure
Surprise
Amazement
Serenity
Attraction

Type
Primary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Primary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Primary

Outgroup
f
%
47
9.5%
42
8.5%
42
8.5%
40
8.0%
39
7.8%
37
7.4%
27
5.4%
25
5.0%
22
4.4%
22
4.4%
22
4.4%
21
4.2%
18
3.6%
16
3.2%
16
3.2%
15
3.0%
13
2.6%
13
2.6%
11
2.2%
9
1.8%

Ingroup
f
%
15
3.3%
23
5.0%
47
10.2%
21
4.6%
54
11.7%
36
7.8%
13
2.8%
9
2.0%
45
9.8%
8
1.7%
9
2.0%
5
1.1%
9
2.0%
33
7.2%
8
1.7%
37
8.0%
13
2.8%
33
7.2%
15
3.3%
27
5.9%

Liberals
Emotion

*
*

*
*
*

*

*
*
*
*

Rage
Cruelty
Disappointment
Desire
Fear
Enjoyment
Terror
Shame
Pleasure
Friendliness
Love
Guilt
Remorse
Fondness
Pain
Despair
Surprise
Attraction
Amazement
Serenity

Primary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Primary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary

Outgroup
f
%
96
11.7%
73
8.9%
71
8.6%
66
8.0%
60
7.3%
51
6.2%
45
5.5%
43
5.2%
40
4.9%
38
4.6%
31
3.8%
29
3.5%
27
3.3%
26
3.2%
24
2.9%
23
2.8%
22
2.7%
21
2.6%
20
2.4%
16
1.9%

Ingroup
f
%
29
3.0%
5
0.5%
47
4.8%
86
8.8%
34
3.5%
73
7.5%
13
1.3%
21
2.2%
59
6.1%
142
14.6%
120
12.3%
23
2.4%
39
4.0%
66
6.8%
26
2.7%
22
2.3%
27
2.8%
45
4.6%
47
4.8%
49
5.0%

Note. The left-most set of columns represent conservative participants’ responses, and the right-most set of columns represent liberal
participants’ responses. Both sets of responses are sorted by the highest-frequency emotions attributed to the outgroup. Secondary
emotions are listed in bold font and positive emotions are designated with asterisks.
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Figure 1. Experiment 1 average linguistic abstraction scores by stimulus target group
membership, stimulus target behavior valence, and experimental condition. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 average number of emotions selected by target group membership,
emotion type, and experimental condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Note
that in each trial—ingroup target or outgroup target—participants could select a maximum of 20
emotions. However, this graph depicts the within-trial factor of emotion type (primary or
secondary), and within that factor a maximum of 10 emotions could be selected per cell.
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Figure 3. Experiment 1 average number of emotions selected by target group membership,
emotion type, and participant ingroup. The top panel shows data for only positive emotions
whereas the bottom panel shows data for only negative emotions. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals. Note that in each trial—ingroup target or outgroup target—participants
could select a maximum of 20 emotions. However, these graphs depict the within-trial factors of
emotion valence (positive or negative) and emotion type (primary or secondary), and within
those factors, a maximum of 5 emotions could be selected per cell.
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Figure 4. Experiment 2 average linguistic abstraction scores by stimulus target group
membership, stimulus target behavior valence, and experimental condition. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 average number of emotions selected by target group membership,
emotion type, and experimental condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Note
that in each trial—ingroup target or outgroup target—participants could select a maximum of 20
emotions. However, this graph depicts the within-trial factor of emotion type (primary or
secondary), and within that factor a maximum of 10 emotions could be selected per cell.
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Figure 6. Experiment 2 average number of emotions selected by target group membership,
emotion type, and participant ingroup. The top panel shows data for only positive emotions
whereas the bottom panel shows data for only negative emotions. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals. Note that in each trial—ingroup target or outgroup target—participants
could select a maximum of 20 emotions. However, these graphs depict the within-trial factors of
emotion valence (positive or negative) and emotion type (primary or secondary), and within
those factors, a maximum of 5 emotions could be selected per cell.
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Appendix A
Experiment 1 instructions for attention manipulation (adapted from Tincher et al., 2016)
Mindful Attention Instructions:
We would now like to provide you with some instructions to follow for the next part of the
study. You will shortly be presented with a series of pictures. We would like you to view and
think about these pictures using the “observing perspective.”
•

•

First, observe the thoughts and other reactions you have about these scenes. As you have
a specific thought or reaction, you’ll notice that it first arises, and then it dissipates similar to how waves arise on the ocean and then dissipate.
Second, understand that these thoughts and reactions are just transitory, fleeting mental
states. These fleeting mental states may include thoughts about the scene, internal bodily
reactions, emotional reactions, and so forth.

What’s different about this “observing” perspective is that you experience your thoughts and
reactions about the scene as fleeting mental states. You remain aware that they’re just thoughts
and reactions as you are sitting here in the room. In summary, when you use the “observing
perspective” rather than live out the event, you simply observe your thoughts and reactions to it
in the present moment. As you notice your thoughts and reactions to the events in the scenes,
please don’t try to avoid or suppress them. Just remain aware that they’re thoughts and reactions,
and observe them as mental states that arise and dissipate.
Immersion Instructions:
We would now like to provide you with some instructions to follow for the next part of the
study. You will shortly be presented with a series of pictures. We would like you to view and
think about these pictures by completely immersing yourself in them. When you completely
“immerse yourself” in an event, you live the experience. You travel in time to the event. You
project yourself into it. It seems like you’re actually there. It’s as if the event were happening in
the moment. When you completely “immerse yourself” in an event, you also often experience it
in vivid detail that might include:
•
•
•

•

Colors, sounds, smells, and other sensory aspects of being there in the situation
Emotions and feelings that arise while living the event
Physical sensations and bodily states that also arise while living the event, such as your
heartbeat, an adrenaline rush, tightening of the chest, feeling tense, faster breathing, or
calming sensations such as slower breathing or relaxation
You might seem to hear what yourself and other people are saying in the situation
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In summary, when you completely “immerse yourself” in an event, it’s as if you were having a
vivid daydream that you enter and live to the fullest. As a result of living the event in vivid
detail, it almost seems real to you. You experience it almost as if it were actually happening.
No Instructions Condition:
Now we will show you a series of pictures. After viewing the pictures, we will ask you a few
questions about your experience of viewing them.
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Appendix B
Experiment 1 political ingroup threat paragraphs
[Displayed to all participants]: We would now like you to read the following statement and
provide us with feedback on how it makes you feel.
[For non-control experimental condition participants only]: As you read it, please remember to
continue to [apply the “observing perspective” / completely immerse yourself in the text]. That
is, remember to [notice your thoughts and reactions to the words, trying not to avoid or suppress
them. Just remain aware that they’re thoughts and reactions, and observe them as mental states
that arise and dissipate. / try and live the experience by projecting yourself into it and
experiencing it in vivid detail. You experience it almost as if it someone were actually speaking
to you right now.]
[Displayed to liberals only]: Liberals might be educated, but they are incredibly naïve. They
don’t appreciate the threats we face as a country, and most of them have never had to work hard
for anything. Liberals don’t really stand for anything; they posture being all about justice but are
really just about what makes them feel good. They tend to be arrogant, probably because their
parents spoiled them rotten. They seem to only care about themselves, or people who think like
them. We are facing social collapse and the erosion of American values, and liberals are
continually making these problems worse. Liberals think they are in the right, but they are
hurting our country.
[Displayed to conservatives only]: Education has been wasted on conservatives; any facts that
don’t fit their cause are disregarded or feed into their paranoia. They don’t appreciate the
hardships people face in our country, and most of them never have had to work hard for
anything. Conservatives don’t really stand for anything other than bigotry and fear-mongering.
They tend to be full of fear, probably because of abusive or domineering parents. They seem to
only care about themselves, or people who look like them. We are facing environmental collapse
and the erosion of human rights, and conservatives are continually making these problems worse.
Conservatives think they are in the right, but they are hurting our country.
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Appendix C
Experiment 1 Linguistic Intergroup Bias stimuli
Person A is a liberal/conservative.

Person A is a liberal/conservative.

1) A is walking an elderly person across the road.

1) A is picking up trash.

2) A is helping an elderly person across the road.

2) A is looking after the park.

3) A cares for elderly people.

3) A respects nature.

4) A is caring.

4) A is conscientious.
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Person A is a liberal/conservative.

1) A is picking up the other person

1) A is running.

2) A is helping the other person.

2) A is training.

3) A is concerned about the other person.

3) A loves sports.

4) A is considerate.

4) A is athletic.
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Person A is a liberal/conservative.

1) A is telling a sexist joke.

1) A is throwing trash on the ground.

2) A is spreading a sexist joke.

2) A is littering the park.

3) A enjoys sexist humor.

3) A disrespects nature.

4) A is sexist.

4) A is disrespectful.
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Person A is a liberal/conservative.

1) A is spray-painting the wall.

1) A is hitting the other person.

2) A is vandalizing the wall.

2) A is hurting the other person.

3) A doesn’t care about other people’s property

3) A hates the other person.

4) A is destructive.

4) A is aggressive.
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Appendix D
Experiment 2 Linguistic Intergroup Bias stimuli

Person A is a liberal/conservative.
Person A is a liberal/conservative.

1) A is walking an elderly person across the road.

1) A is picking up trash.

2) A is helping an elderly person across the road.

2) A is looking after the park.

3) A cares for elderly people.

3) A respects nature.

4) A is caring.

4) A is conscientious.
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Person A is a liberal/conservative.

1) A is picking up the other person

1) A is writing notes.

2) A is helping the other person.

2) A is studying.

3) A is concerned about the other person.

3) A enjoys studying.

4) A is considerate.

4) A is motivated.
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Person A is a liberal/conservative.

1) A is looking at someone’s answers.

1) A is throwing trash on the ground.

2) A is cheating on a test.

2) A is littering the road.

3) A doesn’t care about cheating on tests

3) A disrespects nature.

4) A is dishonest

4) A is disrespectful.
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Person A is a liberal/conservative.
Person A is a liberal/conservative.

1) A is spray-painting the wall.

1) A is hitting the other person.

2) A is vandalizing the wall.

2) A is hurting the other person.

3) A doesn’t care about other people’s property

3) A hates the other person.

4) A is destructive.

4) A is aggressive.
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Appendix E
Experiment 2 instructions for attention manipulation (adapted from Tincher et al., 2016)
Mindful Attention Instructions:
We would now like to provide you with some instructions to follow for the next part of the
study.
On the next screen, we will play a short audio clip. We would like you to close your eyes while
you listen, and use what we call the "observing perspective."
•

•

First, observe the thoughts and other reactions that you have about the clip. As you have
a specific thought or reaction, you’ll notice that it first arises, and then it changes in some
way, or fades away altogether - similar to how waves arise on the ocean and then fade
away.
Second, understand that these thoughts and reactions are just temporary, fleeting mental
states. These fleeting mental states may include thoughts about the clip, internal bodily
reactions, emotional reactions, and so forth.

What’s different about this “observing” perspective is that you experience your thoughts and
reactions about the clip as changing mental states. You remain aware that they’re just thoughts
and reactions as you are listening. In summary, when you use the “observing perspective” rather
than live out the event, you simply observe your thoughts and reactions to it in the present
moment. As you notice your thoughts and reactions to the events in the clip, please don’t try to
avoid or suppress them. Just remain aware that they’re thoughts and reactions, and observe them
as mental states that arise and fade.
We will ask you to practice this observing perspective as you listen, and then guide you through
an interactive practice right after the audio clip is done playing.
Immersion Instructions:
We would now like to provide you with some instructions to follow for the next part of the
study.
On the next screen, we will play a short audio clip. We would like you to close your eyes while
you listen, and completely immerse yourself in the audio clip. When you completely “immerse
yourself” in an event, you live the experience. You travel in time to the event. You project
yourself into it. It seems like you’re actually there. It’s as if the event were happening in the
moment. When you completely “immerse yourself” in an event, you also often experience it in
vivid detail that might include:
•
•

Colors, sounds, smells, and other sensory aspects of being there in the situation
Emotions and feelings that arise while living the event
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Physical sensations and bodily states that also arise while living the event, such as your
heartbeat, an adrenaline rush, tightening of the chest, feeling tense, faster breathing, or
calming sensations such as slower breathing or relaxation
You might seem to hear what yourself and other people are saying in the situation

In summary, when you completely “immerse yourself” in an event, it’s as if you were having a
vivid daydream that you enter and live to the fullest. As a result of living the event in vivid
detail, it almost seems real to you. You experience it almost as if it were actually happening.

No Instructions Condition:
We will now play a short audio clip. We would like you to close your eyes while you listen to
the clip. After listening, we will ask you a few questions about your experience.

After Shark Attack Audio Clip Ends (mindful attention condition only):
Now, please briefly close your eyes again and take a few moments now to observe any thoughts
and other reactions you are having in this moment, whether about the audio clip you just heard or
anything else. [Pause]
Scan through your body and notice any sensations. [Pause]
Notice any sounds in the room you are in or that are outside. [Pause]
Notice any distinct feelings or thoughts you are having. [Pause]
And as you notice these things, also notice that all of these experiences arise and change or fade
away on their own. They are not permanent, but are rather part of a constantly changing
landscape of experiences. [Pause]
You can now open your eyes and press the arrow button when you are ready to continue.

